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INTRODUCTION 
When the All1ied governments went into Ger.ma.ny 
I 
at the end of the war, 1one of the major economic proble ms 
was the decartelizatiod of 
I 
German industry. Up to this 
point it had g~nerally 'been conceded tha t the I. G. Farben 
combine, the l a r gest cartel in the world, woul d be 
I 
immediately broken up because of the detrimental effects 
it had ca used worl d tr~de since its ince pti on . I . 
With a ll the evidence and know l edge that had 
been gained about the German ca rtel manipulations, the r e 
I 
appears from the very moment the Allies took over an 
undercurrent driv i ng tpward the prevent ion of the breaking 
of the Farben combine and the internment of its offic ia l s . 
There be gan a new movement to urge cartelization, to 
I 
a ttem p t to propagandize its good effects up on the market 
I 
situation in the pa st, to smooth over the .9.ctions of 
some of the larger car'tels du rin e; the per:tod of the 
I 
thirties a nd attempt to ease a new car tel movement into 
the picture. 
I 
It is readily con ceded that par t of this move 
may be based unon pol~tical necessity and tha t such a 
basis ma y have much justification, however in this 
I 
thesis we are primarily concerned with the economic 
I 
aspe cts of t h e movemeqt an d will attempt to show that 
economically carteliz4 t i on is not a sound policy. It 
will further be illustrated that political and economic 
5. 
theory when combined do not make for a wholesome interna -
tional trade philosophy. 
With s o many parts of the world facin g huge 
shortages of capital and consumption g oods, it does not 
seem conceivable tha t there is justification for the 
revival of the artificial controls which v;ere a failure 
in the 1920-1930 era when they were tried. For the most 
part this thesis will -discuss the cartel as it was created 
and used by the German and later adopted by the British 
during the period between the two g reat wars. It is 
hoped that the detrimental effects of the movement will 
be pointed out to the reader and that it may be seen 
that future moves in this direction cannot have any 
attributes as we attempt to form a new free internationally 
trading world. 
6. 
bhapter I 
I 
GENERAL HISI):'ORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
I 
Present cJay i e c onomists will readily admit and 
I 
agree to the existence [ of wide fields of business activity 
where the competin g fa 1ctor has degrees of imper.fect:i.on 
I 
present. Combination! and the elimination of competition 
is no lon ger considere ~ malpra ct i ce on many fronts. One of 
i 
I 
the manipulations usedl in bring in g ab out these imperfections 
is the cartel, the usel of wb ich g rew to g reat len gths after 
the first world war. 
There are J larying definitions of a cartel many 
of wh ich agree with eawh other :tn essence: 
- I 
I 'Industria~ synd icates, also called cartels , are 
understandin g s concluded between producers, who 
conserve ~heir autonomy, to restrict or suppress 
competiti ~n . " "An industrial cartel is an 
understandin g between produc ers of two or several 
countries) who while conservin g their inde pendence 
agree to ~a ke measures in common wi th a view to 
restricti~g or suppress i n g co mpetition in the 
in ternational marke t. " (l) 
The definition g iven Jy the authors of the Leag~e of Nations 
-- I 
is worded a l ittle dilferently: 
"Cartels a~e associations of independent under-
takin ~s i d the same or similar branches of 
indus~ry ~s t abl ishe d with a view of improving 
condition~ of production an d sale. They are 
calle d • s~ndicates' or 1 comptoirs t where they 
have set q. p a compe t ent sale s organ ization." ( 2) 
i 
I 
l. International ~ombines - Modern His tory by Alfred 
: lummer, S ir I~aac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., London 
quoting Dr. ]o~e rt Jac car d from Las Syndicates, 
Industriaels em Sursse 
2. League of Natibns General Report on the Economic 
Aspects of Int~rnational Industrial Agreeme~ts , 
No. E 736, Geneva 1931 
I 
I 
I 
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It will be noted that these definitions say 
nothing specifically afout the restriction nor suppression 
of competition, but the implication appears to be present 
I 
that efforts of cartel~ to improve the position of thei r 
members will result in !a certain cu rtailment of unnecess ~ ry 
or excessive competiti~n . The attainment of the object 
of a cartel nece ss itaty the members agreein g in the common 
interes ts of their un d~ rtakin g s to take a number of Joint 
steps in connection wi t h both t he pro du ction and sale of 
I 
their products with a +iew to influencing or re gulating the 
i 
conditions of the mark~t as extensive l y as possible. I t is 
I . 
essen tial for the attainment of this object and therefore 
! 
conclusive as regards the character of the cartel as such, 
I 
that it should compris ~ the majority , or at any rate the 
I 
preponderant part, of ~he pro duc ers or s e l l e rs of the partie-
' 
ular goods conce rned t? such an extent as to compel the 
I 
majority of consumers l o a pply to the carte l for the satis-
faction of their• requirements . 
- I 
It may be questioned whe t her or not internati onal 
I 
cartels have the strength to combine to the extent of mono -
1 . i 1 . t. po y or even a quas 1-m~:mopo y p as J. J. on. 
I 
There are, however, 
I 
some cartels which appfoa c h the example of monopoly one 
be ing the tin industry iwhere something like three - quarter s 
of the world ' s output ~as sme lted by t wo British compan ies 
wtb. ich owned between thlm a ll the smelting v,; orks in Grea t 
Britain, Pe i ping and 
I 
l 
s r-n gapore . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Thus, before World Var II 
8. 
I 
i 
I 
I 
! 
i 
I 
I 
I 
not only did the Briti9h Empire produce 35 per cent of the 
world 1 s output of raw ~in, but throu gh these two companies 
I 
i 
the British had a powe~ful quasi-monopolistic position in 
i the smelting section. I (1) 
However, an !international cartel, unless a trust, 
does not constitute a J reat unified entity holding property 
I 
of its own; cartels codmonly hold little property. They are 
i 
in essence, merely ind1strial alliances between a number of 
I 
separate units in two 9r more countries, or between t wo or 
; 
more cartels or some ildependent produ cers and one or more 
I 
cartels. Nobody surr~nders the ri ght to be the master of 
I 
I 
I 
his own house. In its1 loosest form a cartel may be 
I 
generally described as ~ gentleman's agreement. 
I 
Description i 
I It may be f~rtber noted that cartels may be domes-
tic or international b~ nature, being international if tbe 
form of business is per~itted to cross frontiers. If the 
I 
I 
cartel is domes tic, i ts i effec ti venes s vv i thin a sin gle 
I 
country will be limitedl by foreign competition subject to 
whateve r protection , ta~iff policies and internat i onal 
I 
I 
shipping costs may be. 1 (2) 
1. 
2. 
I 
National Combin~s , Modern History by A.lfred Plummer 
published by Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., London 
International C~rtels & ~ orl d Peace, Study an d Report 
by Dr. Corwin D
1
• Edwards, Prepared for and Published 
by Sub-Committe~ on War Mobilization of Senate 
Committee on Mi~itary Af f airs, Senator Harley M. 
Kilgore, Chairmr n, page 3 . 
I 
9. 
The Lea gue of Nations' description of a cartel 
mentioned pr eviously has been criticized from some schools 
I 
of thought. The phrase "improving conditions of produc-
tion and sale" when lo~ked at under close observation appears 
ambiguous. It is not 1clear to whom the improvement accrues 
whether to the members of the cartel, the industry at large, 
or to the economic society as a whole. It may further be 
pointed out tha t the de~initions cited for a cartel are so 
broad in scope that they may fit a non-cartel t ype of 
ass ociation as ·well as what we generally conclude as being 
I 
a cartel. The definition could probabl y fit with equal 
accuracy the usual type~ of trade associations and price 
fixin g groups th~ we s~e in the market periodically. (1) 
With the above c riticism in mind, we mi ght attac k 
i 
the aforementioned comment that a cartel is not necessarily 
a monopoly since it wou~d appear tha t the exercising of 
monopolistic powers for
1 
the con trol of the market is neces-
sary to our description of a cartel if we are to isolate 
characteristics enabling us to arrive at some type of 
definition. 
The diversity of the forms an d de g ree of monopoly 
I 
power make some further breaking d own of the monopol y concept 
I 
necessary, if an attempt is to be made t o g ive more preci-
sion to the cartel conc~pt. The immediate pr oble m t herefore, 
1. Cartel Problems by Carl Pribam, published by the 
Booking s Institute, Washing ton , D. C., pa ges 10-11 
10. 
I 
I 
I 
becomes that of examin~ng the means utilized in the exercise 
I 
o;f market control and 1eciding which one amon g them the 
cartel concept shall b~ a pp lied. .S omewhat tentatively it 
I 
I 
is suggested tha progr j ss towards a more illuminating def-
inition of cartels can be made by resortin g to the "risk 
concept" an d examining I the means of collective action for 
the a voidance of ris k . [ ( 1) 
Need and Growth I 
I j i n the prev+ous sect on we have seen some of the 
aspects tha t may help J s to distinguish a cartel from other 
forms of business org, ization. Now to carry it a few 
ste p s f urthe r, our invjstigation centers u p on the elements 
present in the marke t an d what of those elements has facil-
1 I . 
ita ted the cartelizati0n movement. 
Probably be ~ inning a round 1879 a new protectionist 
I 
e ra came int o being in i the interna tional tra de world . It 
I 
cann o t be said that cartels were caused by this movement, 
I but they were undoubte ~ ly f acilitated in their formation by 
I 
t h e philos ophy apparenr at tha t time. 
Expanding up on our thesis of the first section,we 
I 
may further consider the element of ris k in the ca rtel 
I 
picture. It may b e stated tha t: 
I 
I 
"The fundam~ntal cause of the formation of cartels 
I lie s in the g rowth of l a r ge scale enterprise." 
( 2) I 
I 
1. Ibid p. 11 I 
2. Cartels, Concerns an d Trusts, Dr. Robert Liefmann, 
E. P . Dutton & r o., Inc., New York , page 20 
11. 
The truth of this simple statement probably is apparent but 
important is the fact that as enterprise grew so did the 
need for capital investment and as this need grew capital 
risk kept increasing , while at the same time falling profits 
caused a point of equilibrium to be reached wh ile the 
profits were no longer c onsidered to be adequate to compen-
sate for the increasing capital risk. When this thesis 
came into realization the cartel movement began to reach its 
first stage of development. (1) 
12. 
It must be brough t u p at this time that the conten-
tion that the cartelization movement was strictly economic 
in nature is not entirely true. It must be noted that 
cartel restrictions may often conflict with national restric-
tions and in so doin g will become an instrument for a 
restricted national policy which may result in an attack 
upon the national interests of another c ountry . In some 
cases they may resist subordination to the particular 
country's national policy. However, a cartel is usually 
d ominated by the enterprise of a single nation. When this 
is so the economic factors may become completely subordin-
ate to those of political nature. In particular we mlght 
note that the cartel may readily be use d for political 
purposes if one nation's participating enter prise is 
politi cally minded whereas those of another nationality are 
1. Cartels, Concerns and Trusts, Dr. Rober t Liefmann, 
E. P . Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, paee 20. 
concerned primarily wi th their business interests. (1) 
Obviously the illustrations of the above paragraph 
were the various cartels d ominate d by German concerns 
during and after 1Norld 11 ar One where use was made by the 
German g overnment to maintain their exp orts abroad and 
supplies of foreign exchange (partly economic and partly 
political in nature). Where the policies of the cartel of 
a particular nation a 1 g overnment (in this case Germany) were 
brought into harmony, the effect wa s often the use of g overn-
ment restrictions to re-enforce the p owe r of the cartel or 
the use of the cartel to accept the restrictive uses of 
g overnment. 
Another fact or lead ing to the need and g rowth of 
the cartelization movement may well be terme d security . 
Under this ~uise c a rtels were use d d urin g the last quart er 
century, a gain particularly by Germany , for the revival of 
military streng th with in the Re ich and tre military and 
political preparation for the present war. With cartel 
members outside the Ge r man Emp ire often politically subser-
vient to dominant German enterprises, and with the German 
members of cartels increasing ly subject to the control of 
state, cartel activities between the two was contributed 
1. International Cartels an a - ~ orld Peace, Study and 
Report by Dr. Corwin D. Edwards, Prepared for and 
Published by Sub-committee on Wa r Mobilization of 
the Senate Committee on Military ~ffairs, Senator 
Harley M. Kil g ore, Chairman, Page s 22 to 24. 
13. 
to the development of a re-armed and a ggressive Germany and 
to the weakening of states which were likely to opp ose 
German nationa l policy. (1) 
Unquestionably a rrang e ments between Germany and 
allied concerns in munition and chemical industry aided 
greatly in creating an a tmos phere of acqu iesence to the 
revival of German munition pro duction durin g; the 1920's in 
viol a tion of the rrreat y of Versailles. The Reich made 
strong use of trade penetration, p olitical propaganda, 
collection of strate g ic information about forei gn indus-
tries, and attempted to suppress development of strateg ic 
industrles which might be hostile to Germany. In many 
cases cartel arrang ements were so close tha t strate g ically 
important in dustrial informa t ion was un d oubte d l y trans-
p orted by German citizens (re presentatives of the g overn-
ment) t o the detriment of the military security of other 
n a tions. Presumably public officials in the free trad-
ing nations were i gnorant of the ex i stence of the cartel. 
One fin a l fact needs enligh tenment at this point 
and that is the consideration of de p ressed periods a s a 
prime f a ctor for t he need of a cartel. It is probably 
true that the increasing ratio of fixe d capital to variable 
capital an d the subse quent g rowth of cor porate cap ital has 
lessened the ability of priva te enterprise to shift its 
production from one commodity to anothe r or to adjust the 
1. Ibid 
14. 
output to a shrunken demand without suffering losses in 
investment. Here once again we see the problem of the 
increased element of risk in a decreasin g profit situation 
entering the discussion. ( l) 
It will be erroneous, howeve r, to assume that 
cartels owe their ori g in and existence only to the pressure 
of a d verse business con ditions. In numerous instances 
far-sig hted industrial leaders have not hesitated to organ-
ize cartels in order to re gulate capital so that over-
expansion and its repercussions d o not occur with a decline 
in business activity. Many times these a g ree ments have 
been reache d in period s of early industrial development, 
or periods of high business activity wi th wide profit 
margins. It mi ght be noted that where combination h a s not 
existed it will be seriously consi dered when a point is 
reached where profits be g in to waver slightly (even thou gh 
these profits may b e hi gh), the incenti ve to maintain these 
profits at previous levels b ecomes very strong and the 
factors preventing combination be g in to fall astray. The 
point at which this incentive is re ached d epends u p on the 
structure of the in dustry; capital intensive industries 
a ppear to reach it first. (2) 
1. Codes, Cartels, National Planning , by Bruno Burn , 
McGraw Hill Book Co., New Yor k and Lon don, 
pages 20 - 25. 
2. D. ~ arriner, Combines and Rationalization in 
Germany, page 102. 
15. 
In closing the discussion of the need of the 
cartel movement it must never be overlooked that the reason 
for formation mi ght be just plain "exploitiven in nature. 
Shou ld the industry be such that not many competitors have 
entered the field, and profit mar g ins high enough, the 
·~ indus try in the field may deem it advisable to combine and 
prevent any competition from entering and in any way harm-
ing the exploitive position they can enjoy. (1) 
Tynes and Uses of Cartels 
Cartel organizations differ widely in detail when 
any type of analysis is made with the view of comparing 
specific cases. However, they may gen e rally be class i-
fied under the followin g cate g ories: 
The Association -- In many respects t his will 
resemble a domestic trade association en gaged in restr i c-
tive practices, the cartel will usually have a membership 
of producers from various countries. They will usually 
have formal a greements to do one or any of the followin g : 
Fix prices 
Limit or proportion output, sales or exports 
Allocate market territories 
Redistribute profits in accordance with an 
agreed formula 
Sell throu gh a jointly maintained sales a gency. 
1. Cartel Problems by Carl Pribam, Published by the 
Bookings Institute, Washing ton, D. c., page 21. 
16. 
This t ype of cartel will enjoy a degree of c ontrol 
dependin ~ u p on whethe r they have a l arge por tion of the 
producers as members and whether or not they have been able 
to control the membership. The a ssumption must a l ways be 
present that they d o not anta g onize publi c sentiment against 
their practices. 
The Pa tent Licenses Agree ment will usually be 
found in an in dustry vvhere technolog ical improvement p l ays 
an important part in g ivin g one producer a temp orary 
compet iting advanta ge over others. The a greement will 
usually be of a market sharin g structure based upon exchan ge 
of the results of scientific research. Usually the results 
of any researc h development will be patented in every 
country covered by the cartel an d market allocations to 
members wi ll be carr i e d out by assignment and licen ses. 
As the network of inter-related paten ts and 
processes a gr eements is de velope d , it will necessarily 
require the acceptance by each company of a series of agree-
ments to whi ch that company is not a party. For example; 
if Imperial Chemical Inou strles were t o make an a greement 
with duPont, the a g reement would have to be such that 
I. C. I.'s commitments to I. G. Farben or some other cartel 
member woul d be adequately recognized and pr otecte d . Like -
wi se I. G. Farben in makin g an a greement would have to 
protect the interests of any other cartelists it might be 
committed to . A series of mutually related under-
takings such as this , governin g l a r ge portions of technolo gy 
17. 
in a particular industry makes it increasing l y difficult 
for any individual company to follow an inde pendent 
comme rcial policy without involving itself in sacrifice of 
alliances and losses of information as mus t be too costly 
to be willing l y acce p ted. (1) 
The Combine -- This for m of or ganization will not 
unite members by contract but un der a common organization 
and mana gement. Actually combination take s p lace in the 
form of cor porate enterpr ise, use is made of interlock s of 
stock owne rship and expans i on is d one through t he use of 
subsidiaries of the ma jor cartel. More important is the 
far flun g in dustrial combin e s base d on hol din ~ company 
structures, in which cartelization ramifies through a maze 
of corp orate organ ization as a result of contracts 
between the to p layers of each such combine. (2) 
Cartels as Devices to Con trol Markets 
It may be gener a lly conceded that whatever the 
p rime purpo se of a c a rt e l mi ght b e , there is a l ways 
present a secondary purp ose of enhan cing profit mar gin s by 
t he re duction of compet i tion. Some of t he devices used 
for b ring i n g about this aim mi ght be gene r a li ze d as follows: 
1. Internationa l Cartels & World Peace, S tudy & Re p ort 
by Dr. Corwin D. Edwar ds, prepared for and published 
by Sub committee on War Mobilization of the Senate 
Committee on Milita ry Affair s , Senator Harley M. 
Ki l g ore, Chai rman , page s 7 - 10. 
2. Internation~l Cartel s , S teven En ke & Virgil Salera 
Prentice Ha ll, Inc., 1 947, page 392 
18. 
Direct Price Fixing greements -- This mi ght be 
a ccomplished in one of three ways either by fixin g the 
price as such, controlling p ro duction or allocating markets. 
Re gardle gs of wha t the procedure employed, usually mark et 
pri ces will be forced to a higher level tha ry woul d competi-
tively be obt a ined. Antecedent to a cartel a greeme n t is 
often a price war which has driven prices d own to whqt are 
consi dered absurb levels. In this respect a cartel may be 
offered as constructive remedy, however suc h price wars a re 
often deliberately undertaken as a means to coerce rebel-
lious elements in the industry to accept what a cartel 
group is willing to offer. An example of this mi ght be 
the tungsten carbide agreement reached in 1927-28 between 
Friedrich Krupp Aktiengesellschaft and General Ele c tric . 
Tun gsten carbide was selling for about ~ 50. per pound 
before the agreement went into effect. After the agreement 
t b e price immediately rose to about $453. per pound and 
during the 1 9 30's ran ged from $ 225. to $453. not resuming 
any semblance of norma l price until an anti-trust in d ict-
ment in 1942. (1) 
Impairment of Quality --- It can probably be said 
that a cartel will se l d om concern itself dire ct ly with the 
1. Dr . Corwin D. Ed\·ard s , E c onomic 8· Political As pects 
of International Cartels, Mono gr aph No . l, pa ges 12 
and 13, Subco mmittee on ~ar Mobilization of the 
Committee on Military Affairs, U. S . Sena te, 1944 
19. 
quality of g oo ds, but the necessary effect of t h eir manop-
olistic nature will be to diminish the incentive to improve 
quality and to diminish the ability of buyers to protect 
themselves a gainst low quality. A carte 1 me.:r maintain a 
product in the market in preference to a superior product 
by de grading it or attempting to force its withdrawal by 
art ificial means. (1) 
Allocation of Trade Territories -- In this type 
of agreement the carte l usually is formed to protect the 
home markets of the members from any outside penetration 
by competin g forces. The agreement will usually g o a 
step further and provide for the explo itat ion by cartel 
members of any outside territory by uses of jointly owned 
subsidiaries. These agreements depr ive consumers of the 
possible benefits of lower cost imported commodities and 
in many cases restrict export possibilities by cartel mem-
bers. There is also a great danger that forei gn investment 
will be g reatly de crease d . 
I mperial Chemical In dustries made use of such 
agreements whe r eby they held exclusive ri ghts for many prod-
ucts in the British Empire and Canada. The companies in-
v alve d wou ld further agree to exploit Cana~ian , Brazilian 
and Argentine markets throug h jointly owned concerns. (2) 
1. International Cartels & World Peace, Study & Report 
by Dr. Corwin D. Edwards, prepared for and published 
by Subcommittee on War Mobilization of the Senate 
Committee on Military Affairs, Sen. Harley M. Ki l g ore, 
Chairman, page 11. 
2. Inte rna tional Ca rtels, Stephen Enke and Virg il Salera 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1947, page 395-396. 
20. 
Rest riction of Su pply -- An a greement of this 
type will usually subordinate consumer demand for a prod-
uct for the in dustries desire for additional profits . This 
will often be used in the case of over-production created 
by a decline in demand or the appearan ce of new su pply. 
This method is best illustrated by the rubb er cartel agree-
ments in which Britain attempted to control an unfavorable 
price situation by means of manipulation of su ppl y . In 
such a case substitutes are often forced into the market 
ahead of their time and the indus try will suffer long run 
effects much sooner than t he y woul d have had they been 
wil ling to accept the short run fluctuations as such. (See 
d iscussions on rubber control in later sections.) 
Allocation of Production in In dustrial F ield s --
Closely allied wi th the p receding des cription is the case 
where industries wi ll a g ree not to invade each other's 
fiel ds. It may also arise in a case where one company is 
the leader in the field an d it can control the smaller 
produ cers to the extent of allocating production on a pe r 
quota basis of wha t the prospective demand is believed to be. 
Cartels As Devices To Restrict Prices And Technological Change 
Restriction of Capacity to Products -- This t ype 
of restriction will be initiated when a ll existing c apacity 
is not operatin g at a hi gh ratio an d when the danger of any 
new capacity woul d mean declining prices or a further reduc-
tion of output in establishe d plants. Attemp ts will be made 
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to de lay c onst r u ct ion of eff5c ient p lants, to re p lace 
obsolete ones, to retard development of substitute prod-
u cts, or to prevent the ope ration of competitors who may 
not co- operate with the c arte l. 
Res triction Ur on Invent i on a n d Technological 
Change -- A we ll carteli zed industry will often use their 
ener p. ies in undertaking research to di sc over new uses for 
t heir ol d pro ducts r ather than di scove rin g products or new 
processes t o replace them. There is a question as to 
whe t her researc h i n a c a rtelized industry is successful in 
producin g new fi eld s of in quiry. Many inventions t akin g 
p lace in the fiel d of rese a rc h ma y be fenced in for profit 
pur p oses. The prev ious sente n ce is particularly true 
should invention be of such a nature a s to crea te ra p id 
obsolen ce of existing p lant and machine r y . It may a l so be 
not ed that shoul d the cartel a chieve hi~h prices in selling 
to one g r ou o of custome r s, it s research may be a i med at 
providing ob stacles a gainst efforts of these cust omer s to 
buy c heaper g oods. 
Efforts to ~ eaken In dependent Enterprises -- The 
cartel ma y strike a t an indep en dent producer in it s field 
particularly if he is in a p osition to threa ten the carte l 
in any way . The attac k may come in the f orm of an a t tempt 
to cu t his suoply of raw materials , organize a boy cotte 
amon g his d istr ibutors, make use of e x clusive dealin g con-
tracts, c oncerte d refusals to g r an t patent licen ses or 
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permit a cce p tance to technolo gy , organization and mainte-
nance of loc a li zed p rice wars and threats of pa tent liti-
ga tion. Some of the aforementioned means of attack wil l 
be particularly s u cce ss ful whe r e the e nd eavor is to for ce 
an ind e pen de n t to become a me mber of the car tel. Should 
the cartel be successful alon g any of t h ese mentioned lines, 
the inde pendents p osit i on in the ma r ket wil l be seriously 
hampered. 
The Re la t ion of Cartelization to Efficiency 
In a general way it can be said that a ll evidence 
woul d point ou t that c a rtels and thei r activities tend to 
d iminish efficien cy in the lon g run. It may be possible 
in some c as es that there will be s hort run gains where 
pa t ents and technolog ical information are exchan ge d; ho-vv-
ever, even in these cases the lon g r u n influence will tend 
to lead t o inefficiency. Quite frequently the purpose of 
the c artel wil l b e d ir e ctl y c on cerne d with the preservation 
of a hi gh cost industry . It mig ht be note d that in the 
nitrogen cartel a greement of 1 930 hi gh cost concerns were 
g iven large r quotas than many low cost concerns. However, 
a high cost c oncern's position may be more tenable if the 
cartel has control of raw ma terial su r .plies and there is a 
monopolistic buyin g p osition on the part of members . 
The E conomic E ffects of Ca r tels 
The effect u p on the consume r is se lf-evide nt on ce 
the cartel concept is un d e r stood in general terms, i t becomes 
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apparent that they reduce competition an d in so doing will 
create a highe r price structure than would normally appear 
in the market, in many cases bring in g about smaller con-
sumption, a l essenin f de gree of production and combined 
with these factors lessened employment opportunities. This 
will be true in the case of an international as well as a 
d omestic cartel. It might be carried a step further in 
the international pictur e by c ausin ~ the increase of inter-
national trade barriers, as countries attempt to protect 
their home industries, and wi ll deprive nations of the ad-
vantages of a more extensive international division of 
labor. 
In the preceding paragraph the reference to 
smaller opportunit i es for employment may need clarification. 
It is obvious that the assumption is made that the mobility 
of l abor a n d the flexibility of the wa ge structure are 
limited in the se cases . •J e have dis c arded the the ore tical 
possibility that restrictions in certain in dustries would 
be fo llowe d by a d ownward a d justment in wag e rates to 
secure re-employment of al l displ a ce d persons in more 
competitive industries. ~bile theoretically if a ll indus-
tries were en Ga ged in competition other than the one 
particular industry being cartelized, such an adjustment 
might tak e p lace. It d o e s not seem practical enough for 
the present day world; therefore, it woul d seem that the 
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assumption of a dwindling opportunity for labor by restric-
t i on is true. (1) 
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In regard to this labor problem created by cartel-
ization, it mi ght be noted that export controls are some-
times the cause of emp l oyment evil . In a re cent discus-
sian of the merits of expor t associations a so cal led expert 
maintains that export associations are a g ood thin f. because 
the y do not exploit the home consumer but only the consumer 
abroad . This view is re grettably shortsighted. It fails 
to take a cc oun t o f major e c onomic r epercussions; for 
example, that squeezin g the forei gn consumer depr ives them 
of the means of pur c hasin ~ other g oo c s; that an export 
arran gement amon g producers is lia ble to bring about some 
measures of un derstanding concerning their d omestic sale s 
policy to the disadvanta pe of the domesti c c onsumer ; and 
above all, that the maintenan c e of higher pri c es for exports 
implies a re duced physical volume of exp orts and hence 
redu ce d employment of the home wor kers . ( 2) 
I n addition to the static ef fe cts of cartels upon 
prices, consumption pro duction anc employment; their dyna~­
i c aspects should be mentioned . As we have mentioned 
previously while cartels will stil l en gage in research wi th 
the aim of deve lopin~ technology further for the benefit of 
1. The Nature of the Internationa l Cartel Problem, A 
Cartel Po licy for the United Nations, by Fritz Machlup 
Columbia University Pre s ~, New York , 1945 pages 13 
an d 14. 
2 . Ibid, pages 13 and 1 4 . 
all cartel members, it mi ght be noted that this phil osophy 
can be mis leadin g . The research can . be of a detrimental 
nature for the various reasons we have seen in the preced-
in g section. It mi ght be noted that ar ~uments are strong 
on bath sides of the p icture. (l) 
When attempting to justify cartelization a g reat 
deal is always said about the stabilization of prices. It 
mi pht be noted that the words "price stabiliza tion" when 
discussed always sound g ood and make for much commendable 
debate; however, ri f idity a n d inflexibility of prices whi ch 
mean about the same thing a re used in an entirely opp osite 
sense an~ usually people shudder at the thought of such 
economic phenomena . Advocates of a cartel will argue that 
the criterion of a well -organized economically beneficial 
co-operative is that the price be stabilized at a level not 
above the fluctuatin g prices which woul d prevail in the 
abs en ce of the cartel. Of course, this is probably so 
much propa gan da because obviously pro of of what an averag e 
fluctuatin g price is, woul d be impossible to obtain if 
competition is re gulated. Who can tell what the price 
woulc be an d if the average competitive price is somebody's 
arbitrary guess, it can be generally assumed to be biased 
upwardly in t h e cartel's favor. (2) 
1. Capitalism, Socialis m and Democrac y by Jos. ~. 
S chumpeter, New York , 1942, pages 88-1 01 
2 . The Nature of the International Cartel Problem, A 
Cartel Policy for the United Nat ions, by Fritz 
Machlup, Columbia University Pre ss , New York , 1945 
pages 1 3 and 14. 
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The answer t o the p rice st a b i li zation problem is 
tha t it c a nnot cure the p roblems of indu s trial fluctuations. 
To b e sure in isolated cases, a few select me mbers of the 
g roup may be spared the anxiety of dealin g in a fluctu-
at i n g market but it mi ght be further noted that this will 
usually be at the expense of other me mbers of society not 
en gaged in the carte lized effort. 
The economic untruths in the thesis that r e stric-
tive arran gements will be beneficial t o society b y permitting 
t h e orderly readjusting of an over-expan ded in dustry makes 
a g oo d pro pa ga nd ists argume nt, but d oe s n o t h o l d to o much 
pr a ctica l truth. No cart e l agreement has yet been brough t 
to li f h t wher e any in dustry h a s tak en the b e nef i t o f 
te mp orary restriction to or derl y ad just themselve s an d t h e n 
d iscard the r e striction aft e r readjustme nt has been attained . 
A few cases mi ght be cited where a n expanded i ndustry h as 
pushed high cost producers out of the p icture but usua lly 
t he owners of the hig h cost industries a re pai d premiums or 
s u b sidizations t o wi thdraV'! their capacity . The consumer 
usually pays for this in the end in the form of j a cke d u p 
prices , e tc. (l) 
The ar gument a gainst the orderl y re a djus tin g of 
an over-expa nd e d in dustry mi ght be c a rr i ed a ste p further 
by pointing out tha t unle s s t h e cart e l ha s an iron fisted 
c ontrol over a ll pr oductive e nterp rises that r e a d justment 
l. Ibi d , p age 16. 
- l 
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may not be brou ght about in any form if a system of quo t a s 
is used an d the car t e l is loosely fo r me d. Members a r e apt 
to increase t hei r production in an attemp t to ge t larger 
quotas at some further date. Whe r e this is true it c an be 
seen that the only res ult of t he c art el has been furt her 
maladj ustment and more argument for t he need of a more 
res tr i c tive ca rtel to avert ru inuous price c ompetition. 
One l a st poin t ne ed s men tionin g at t hi s stage and 
tha t is the argument of g overnment control of in cl.u strial 
carte ls. The theory of infant in du stries or a reasonable 
return on investment is oft en adv ocated by businessmen, 
lawye r s , et c. A. vvo r d of c a u tion shoul d be heede d as to 
whe t her they are t a l k i n g about p olit i call y orig inated 
t heorie s or economically or i g inate d theories. ~e can dis-
c a r d the political a r guments at this p oint and s imply note 
that i f t hey a re talkin g about economic materia l s the 
a r guments will u s ually not hol d up . Althou gh we have h ad 
t he infant industry argument for ma ny y ears now , very fe w 
infant industrie s have r ea ched a stag e of maturity where 
g overnmen t p r o t e ction coul d be t aken a way and as f ar a s 
t he justification of the fair return a r gumen t is concerned , 
it cannot stand u _, when the ob vious fa ct s that the return 
mu st be at the expense of the tax payin g public or the 
consumi ng p ub l i c is offered in retaliation. 
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Chapter II 
BACKGR OUND '11 0 THE CARTEL MOVEMENT 
I N GERMA JY AND GRE AT BRI T I N 
Pr ofes s or E lemer Hantos a former Hungarian 
Secretary of S tate who has ma de a s pecial study of cartels 
in Europ e h a s stated: 
" Centra l Europe is the breeding groun d of inter-
national cartels. While in other parts of the 
world cartels hav e been formed as an emerg ency 
measu r e b y the pre ssure of i ndustrial depr e ssion 
there is still another, not less important, cause 
for their creation in the ne~ Central Europe: 
the structural chan ges whic h the once united 
territ ories have under ~ one. In p ost-war ( ~ orld 
War I) Central European interna t ional cartels 
owe their existence to a large extent t o t h e 
en deavor of manufacturers to create political 
facts with r e ga r d to the i r ec onomic effe cts. 
Th e Central Europe an c a rtels a re desi 2ne d to 
brin g i nt o closer union t he productive a n d 
sellin g act i vities of economic territories now 
d i srupted by t a riff barriers . " (1) 
The above quote is used to subst a ntiate the con-
tention of t h i s thes i s that the cartel movement orig inated 
in the Central European area primarily in Germany. It has 
become a s natural a part of German business meth ods a s 
competition to our own way of thinkin g . Great Britain on 
the other hand was the home of free economic thou ght and 
has become a vlctim of the cartelization movement mainly 
throu gh a series of circumstances some of which she may not 
be entirely a t fault for b e ing unable t o comba t , an d others 
~hich she obvi ously refuse d to recogni ze a n d permitted 
1. International Combines - Modern History by Alfred 
Plummer, Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Lt d ., London 
page 5. 
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herself to be swept from the side of a free thinkin g 
economic policy . 
The Cartel Movement In Germany 
Early Development 
It is ha rd to pic k t h e exact point in German 
history when cartelization came into bein g . There are some 
conflicting reports. However, we can generally assume that 
it accompanied the industrialization movement in the 
country . The first industrial boom appearing around 1812 
led to muc h consoli dat i on of heavy industry and expansi on 
of p rodu ctive capacity inside Germany. At the same time 
the German empire was in the process of becomin g a unified 
p olitical entity. ~ ith this pullin ~ together of the many 
separate German nations into a politically matured state 
came the authoritarian principle which a p pears to have 
clun g to that nation u p to the present day . Thus, when a 
prolon ge d depression set in about 1872 an d Ge rmany's ex-
panded productive capacity be gan to meet slackenin g markets 
which lead to compet ition, it can b e un derstood how t h is 
growing polit ical authoritarianism seeped into the 
economic fiel d . 
The y ears 1875 to 1878 were mar k ed by the crea-
tion in the Ruhr di strict of various coal mining associa-
tions and a fterwards, until 1885 , sav the a s sociation resort 
to restrictions of output. After 1879 protection is t 
t ariff poli c i es promoted by heavy in dustries on the claim 
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tha t their overcapitalized concerns be safe guarded against 
foreign competition further i n creased t he demand for c a rtel-
ization polic ies . F~om 1882 to 1886 the coke industry and 
pig iron producers be gan t o resort to cartel policies. 
Carteli zation be gan to c a tch on so ra pi dl y in Germany that 
b y 1883 scien t ific study and a p proval of the m be gan to tak e 
place. (l) 
The po tash indu stry offers the best sing le illus-
tration of the relation of the German sta te to the c a rtel 
movement. Prussia devel oped the first commerc ial potash 
mine i n Germany . In 1861 it be gan operating i ts Stras s furt 
mines to supply po tassium chloride t o a refin ery built by 
private c a pital for this pur p ose. In the s ame year the 
Du chy of Anhalt comp lete d a shaft for the minin g of p otash. 
Soon afterward the Prussian and Anhalt g overnments a gr e ed 
to fix the price at which each woul d sell p otash. In 1887 
t wo private mines had come into operation , and the pri ce 
f ixing a g reement b e t we en Prussia and Anhalt broke down • 
. l ith state revenues thre a t e ne d , Pru ssia took the lead in 
the formation of the f i rst potash cartel embra cing private 
producers. The arrangement p rov ided for the limitation of 
output, fixin g of p rices and a lloca tion of marke t amon g the 
four producers. (2) 
1. Cartel Problems by Carl Pribam , Bo okings Institu te, 
Washing ton, D. C., pages 155-164. 
2. Car t e l s or Competition by Ge o. w . S toc k in g & Myron 
"IN . ,nJa t kin s , Twentie t h Century Fun d , New York , pages 
25 - 26. 
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By 1905 the economic structure of Germany , as far 
a s it wa s to be determined by the c artelizat~on movement 
before the war , was almost completed; there started in March , 
1905 , a prolonged period of a c tivity l astinp until ~oril , 
1913 an d interrupted on l y by a downwar d swing of busines s 
a c tivities ( August 1 907 to October 1908) . In th is period 
the tenden c y towards amal gamation was upper most . Vertica l 
an d horizontal combine s con tribute d t o the rapid c onsolida-
tion in the iron anG steel industries . Af ter the de pre s sed 
pe riod in 1 9 07 and 1 908 the consolida tion movement r ev ived 
very rapidly and numerous merge rs marked the path of 
industrial devel opment fostered b y expansi on of marke t s. So 
thor ou gh had b een the proc ess of consolidation that in the 
German iron an d steel industry a fe w fi r ms be gan to emerge 
as dominant factors supersedin g the smaller con cerns 
which had failed t o join the evolutionary tren d . 
The c onditions i n the German home market at this 
time mi ght offer a partia l exp l anation as to the structure 
of the growln g cartel movement . There was a c ons i derable 
wealth of raw materia l s u p on which to build the expandin g 
iron a n d steel industry out of the larg e saving s of a 
t hrifty popul ation . The home market , however, th ough 
prote c ted a galnst forei gn c ompetit i on , was rather limited 
in its p ower to expan d rap idly a nd the expandin~ p r odu ct i ve 
capacit y in the vari ous in clus tries endange red the prospe c t 
of a profi t able market. Such a situation lent itself t o 
~-1 
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the conception of a home market as something capable of 
being divided and distributed amon g the competing firms, 
as an offset to market weakne s s. 
It will be well to note at this point that 
Germany was not one of the forerunners in the industrial 
movement . Actual l y it cop ied much of its technolo gy from 
England. The inte gration of ready-made technology f rom 
En gland into the German economy made for an abrupt transi-
tion from small scale hand craft to large scale mechanical 
producti.on. The transition took place over the comparative-
ly short period of 30 years . 
Coupled with this rapid expansion of industrial 
production was the need for forei gn markets to absorb 
Germany's g oo ds . However, Germany lacked a free trade 
larg e enou gh to absorb this vo lume. However , it mi ght be 
noted that the prime object of the German g overnment was 
n ot the creation of private income or the upbuil d in g of the 
domesti c ec onomy but was the a ggrandizement of the German 
state. German basic industries were developed not 
economically but wi th political thoughts in mind and cartels 
were used to protect these domestic industries and at the 
same time although, secondary in nature , to exploit the 
market as profitably as possible. 
!bile Germany was build in g as rapidly as possible 
on the basis of wha t it ha d , at the same time it found 
itself s hor t in many basi c raw materials. For example: 
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they were short of boxite and were deficient in many impor-
tant materials . Being in the pos ition of a fabricator 
led them to develop cartels at both ends of the p icture to 
protect themselves. 
~ domesti c cartel was concentrate d for the pur-
chasing pmer of German alumina produce rs increasin ? their 
power to bargain with foreizn suppliers and at the same 
time the y be c ame a strong influence in the international 
aluminum cartel exercised through a part l y owned German-
Swiss Company, for many years a leading exporter of 
refined metal, assured German fabricators a favorable a llot-
ment of metal supplies and a g ood market for their finished 
p r oducts. 
Post World War One 
Neither the German state nor the German business-
men were willing to accept free competi tion as the t y in g 
factor for production, prices, or any other economic pheno-
mena. They both resorte d to controls from the very outset. 
Pr ior to Worl d ~ ar One they ha d practically centralized all 
of Ge rmany's industrial control within national areas and 
were be g innin g to expand into the international field. (l) 
World War One did not halt the cartel movement 
in any sense. Germany ' s productive c apacities were pushed 
to new heights during the wa r and as the war drew to a 
close, she was with much higher capacity in the heavy 
1. Ibid, pages 25 - 29. 
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induBtries than previously. Stee l and ship bui l ding 
fa c ilities had b een expanded and at the end of the war we re 
ill-adapted to p eace time incustries . Not only had this 
move men t taken pl a c e inside Germany but in the rest of tbe 
wor l d as well. The efforts of Germany as a defeated power 
to reorganize and r ationalize their basic i nd ustri es on l y 
increased the mal ad justments v hich w~r e already present in 
the rnarke t. Howeve r, these maladjustments in Ge rmany d id 
not a r pear to hit a peak unt i l abou t 1924. 
Just following 11 orl d War One Germany was hit VIi th 
monetary instab i lity l eadin g to inflationary tendenc i es. 
Increasing inflation fav ored t he expansion of produc tion and 
facilitated the reorgani zat ion of many existing p l ants . Al s o 
aiding t his temporary rec ons tru ct ion wa s the loss o f some 
highly indus trialized terri t ories , such as t he Lorraine 
and u~pe r Silesia are as . t the s arre time Germa ny wa s 
under g oin g a social ized movemen t v.b i ch led to much corp orate 
combination and a ste ady de creAse in competi tion . It 
might be interesting to note that even while this sociali -
zati on was at its pe ak no g re a t market stability was ever 
a c hieved in any way . I ndependent competitive firms 
steadi l y de creased an d a t the same time the car t el moveme nt 
wa s in the ba c kground. 
Ac tually du r in cr th is pe riod un t i l 1924 c on solida-
tion wa s p robabl y tak i ng p l a c e a coupl e of steps be low 
car telizat j on i n the fiel d of syn dicates, assoc iates , etc., 
I 
I 
although t hey d i d appear t o hol d out in so me of t he s oci a l -
ized s chemes su ch as coal . 
The Period 1924 a nd Aft e r 
Germany was struc k by a serious depression in 
1925 probabl y due to the lac k of capi tal in the country 
b ecause the savin g c ap~ c it y ha d b e en greatly de creased by 
the post - war infla tionary period . Many of the corp orate 
firms that had b ee n built u p on the strength of borr owe d 
funds a ppeared on t he brink of collapse . Large trusts and 
cor r orate firms b egan to break up . This p rocess of 
liqu i dation 
activity . 
was paralle l ed by the arri va l of new carte l 
The first c art e ls t o be reorganized were in 
the fiel d of coal whe re heavy curtail men t of pro duction 
began t o t ake p lac e . 
The S t e e l Workers Association wh ich had la p sed 
i n 1919 wa s r e -establis hed in 1924 as the head cartel of a 
long list of steel cartels sub j e c ted t o it s control in 
· almos t a l l lines where c ontrol had been s u cce ss ful i n pre -
war times; the movement to re- open the c ar tel ization effort 
had b egun. For the fir st time in Germany ' s e c onomic 
history th is move men t was 'hardly c he c k e d by t he marked u p 
s wing whi ch set in abou t 1 926 and gave rise to a new 
consolida tion move mu c h f irmer than the pre cedin c one 
c aused by inflation. This time cartelization proc eeded 
hand in hand . Germany was operating on much bo rrowed 
c ap ital, much of it coming from America . The f low was 
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u neven and undependable predi ca ted both u pon t he use of 
increased industrial efficiency and u pon the mar~et control 
available to pr eve n t the c ompetitive d i ssipa tion of 
capital value. (1) 
Cartel a gr eement s a ppeared t o satisfy the 
f in ancial ba ck ers of German in us try durin g this peri od. 
I. G. Farben began to take a lead in the chemical industry 
in 1925. Con trol of raw rna terials V'.r as obtained bJ merg er 
and financial interlockin g , control then extendin g to the 
finishing process base d on the consumption of chemical 
products. I n 1926 several l a r ge c oncerns of the Rhenish-
Westphalian Iron and S teel In dustries began a sing le 
productive orgar..ization un der the United S teel 1.n;orks. The 
examp le set in the Ruhr d is tri ct was followed in Ge rman 
Upper S ilesia as a link between the Ge r ma n Eastern and 
Western iron and stee l combination . A kindred or ga n ization 
was crea ted in central Germany . Characteristic of this 
movement wa s horizontal c ombination. 
The same t endencies were noti ced in other metal 
in dustries, zinc, co pper , et c. International a gr eements 
c on cluded with competin g org anization s abroad were instru-
menta l in safe g uardin g t he home mar ke t and al locating 
p ortions of the world's saleable production. Crisis set 
in wi th the collapse of t he 1\merican boom i n 1929. 
1. Cartel Problems by Carl Pribam, Bookings Institute 
Washin g ton , D. C. , p ages 256- 25 8 . 
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The crisis was short live d however with the 
c oming of the Nazi Party to power and cartelization entered 
a new stage of development makin g new headway particularly 
in the manufacturin g industries. Price fixin g was a pplied 
to more than half of the total in dustrial output of the 
country. Small co n cessions were made to small concerns at 
the expense of large concerns in the name of national well 
being . E fforts to create work for unemp loyed in dustry were 
instrumenta l in modifyin g cartel policies. Price commis -
sioners were a p poin te d with practically unlimited powers to 
c ontrol price commodi ties . In an at t e mp t to create 
economic self-suffi ciency particul arly in agri cultura l 
products, many g oods were freed from the movement of price 
in the worl d market and re g u l ated internally . Cost 
accounting became the basis for the control of price 
fixing . 
Summary 
In tra c in g the historic background of the cartel 
movement in Ge rmany, a few basic p oints come to light wh ich 
mi ght well be remembered: First, Germany was l ate in both 
political an d in dustrial development, its political develop-
ment being authoritar ian in nature, its industrial develop-
ment being copied from Gre a t Bri tain in technical form 
being not in philosophical terms. Secon d , there has ne ver 
been any in d ication that Germany bas experimented with or 
been willing to subject themselves t o fr ee competition as 
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we have known it in the period of the twenties. E ven after 
World 'ar One they were obviously enga ged in social i zed 
in dustry in their domestic ma rkets. Thir d , World Wa r One 
a ggra vated a sit uation that had been troublesome pre vious 
t o the war in that participating countries expande d many 
of t heir b a sic industries far more than the y woul d have 
un der competitive cond itions. This expansi on le d to a 
te mpora r y over supply situa tion in the post-war world . 
Th e mark et wa s unabl e t o abs orb t h e out put of man y of the 
heavy in oustries. Fourth , the c oming to p ower of the Nazi 
g overnment ad ded t o Germany's disruptin g movements but 
a ga in bring ing to the fr ont p ol itic a l motives for t h e 
con trollin g of German indu s try b oth domestically and 
internationally . This fact in particul a r led to the great 
expansion of the cartel movement du rin g the period of the 
1 930 ' s . Germany was in a position to i gnore comp l et e ly 
freely competitive sup ply an d demand an d con duct the ir 
op era tions on politica lly expounded thinking . Cartels were 
a conve n ient device for these motives . 
THE CARTEL MOVEMENT I N GRE AT BRI TAIN 
Early Development 
Great Britain bas a l ways been considered the home 
of free competit ion. Their in dustrial devel opment prior 
to World War One wa s probably the faste~t a nd most a dvanced 
in the world . They had f e w raw materials a n d with the comin g 
of the Industria l Revolution foun d themselves in a p osition 
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to t~ke advan ta~ e of in te rnationa l t rade op portunities in 
r aising the general stan dards of liv ing of their populace. 
Their ve ry existe n ce as a world power bec ame 
pr~ dicated u pon the expandinJ internationa l trade opportu-
n:ities throughout the worl c . The purchase of r aw materials 
from undeveloped areas brought into En~lish markets re-
finished a nd then in turn sold throughout the world became 
the familiar p icture of the British trade techniques. 
However, i n t he early 1900's with carteli zation efforts 
t akin~ p lace on the Continent in moderate form, En g l and 
too, be gan to experiment very limi t edly in a few fields; 
cement indus try , 1900-1918, whiskey distilling , 1 902-1907, 
tobacco industry 1 901 . However, it may be said th~t this 
c ontrol was very wea k a n d it probably wa s not cartel-lik e 
in stru ctu re a r. d very little control was e x erted over the 
mar ke t. A.s 1 Jorld lJ.rar One ap p roached, En g land like 
Germany was forced t o e xpand many of its basic in dustries 
for the war time effort. At t he e nd of the war she , like 
Germany, was faced with con ditions of havin g t o re-est a blish 
peace time trade at a hi ~her level du e t o increased capacity ; 
and foun d facin g her a depressed market. 
World War One and After 
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At the close of the war i t is believed t hat Bri t ain 's 
immediate objective was to recap ture its p osition i n the 
world through the familiar patt ern of free competition; how-
ever, depressed c ondi tions and unemployment began to have 
its effects on public opinion. Modifications of free 
enterprise thinkin g be gan to take place . Loss of markets 
abroad due to increased co mpe tition and a poor cost posi tion 
became instrumental i n developin g schemes for preferential 
trade agreements wi th the British Emp ire. The thinking of 
the time in the Empire may be illustra ted by a quotation 
from a Balfour Committee re p ort: 
" I t is, we think, abundantly clear from our survey 
that the first ste p toward putting British 
industry in a position to compete successfully 
in overseas markets, is to subject their organ -
ization and equipment to a thorough process of 
reconditionin g . It has been made plain that 
the recondi tioning of British industry will 
undoubtedly involve a g reat deal of scrapp ing 
and replacement of plant and enlargement of the 
industrial unit , both by growth and re group ing 
of units through consolida tions and other forms 
of a s sociation , s o as to obtain the full benefits 
of larg e scale production , elimination of wa ste, 
standardization and simplification of practise 
and all the other measures of e c onomy usually 
included un der rationalization." (1) 
It wi ll be noted that the Balfour Comreittee recognized the 
poor cost condition of British industry. At the time there 
is some indication that they believed obsolesence may have 
bee n takin g plac e at some sta ge s of p roduction. It is 
further a pparent tha t for the first time authoritarian lik e 
phi losophy began cropp ing into the p icture. They begin to 
talk about dictated consolida tion, p l anned economic 
moves, etc. 
1. Final Report of t h e Committee on Industry and Trade, 
( Balfour Committ ee) London , 1 929 , page 297. 
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Further indication of the departure fro m the long 
acce p ted free competi tion philosophy is expressed in the 
followin g quotation: 
"The depression has prove d to be so chronic that 
it is now having the effect of encoura g in g cartel-
izatlon. The bllnd optimis m ·which saw at the 
turn of every y ear signs of a trade revival has 
advanced. It is admitted on every hand that 
mere optimism is not sufficient and that the 
repetition of the mystic wo r ds 'trade cycle' 
does not in itself insure that a lon g slump is 
bound to be followed by a boom. " (1) 
The only safe guard to the abuses of combina tion 
offered by the prop onents of the movement at this time was 
tha t the public could be pr otected by the use of publicity. 
The feelin g seeme d t o be t ha t economic liberalis m was no 
longer compatible v ith Britain's industrial interests . It 
is believed t hat some kin~ of economic co-operation would 
be beneficial. It did not seem that any realizat ion was 
a p parent of the dang er of growth of controls f u rther cur-
tailing Britain's forei gn trade rath~r than enlarg ing it as 
was the belief. 
During th~ period of the mid dle t wenties collective 
efforts be gan to increase. One of the leaders in the move-
ment was Sir Al fred Mon d who took an active part in the 
organization of the now famous combine Imperial Chemical 
Industries, Limited, 1926. Mond was firmly convinced that 
competition was an outmoded theory and that co-operation was 
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1. The Dynami cs of In dustrial Combination , H. A. Marquand, 
1931, page 11 . 
needed to combat i t . He believed that s pe c ialists should 
gu ide the every move of busine ss b y s c ien tifica lly a ll o c at -
ing funds and de ciding p ro duction . He beli e ved that com-
munity interests woul d be better pr ovided for by the use 
of carte l s an d merger agr ee me nt s. His p icture went so far 
a s to include the entire wor ld in this great new moveme n t 
of c o-operative effort. (l) 
As the movement pr og ressed compulsory car teliz-
ation be gan t o t ake place in the coal in dustries . Restric-
tions of output were for c ed u p on still reluctant mine 
owners. In 1934 a ction was taken i n the steel industry t o 
t he extent of makin g tariff protection c onditi ona l u p on 
some sort of combined ac tion by the industry to re p:ulat e 
compe titive c ondi tion s. This movement is particula rly in t er -
esting be cause it illustrates that although the theorist s 
have been preachin g combination for almost ten y ears, 
voluntary efforts as su ch were still provin g unsuccessful 
and str on g a r med me tho ds we re be i ng forc ed . Britain's 
experienc e h as taught us the tremend ous difficulty of 
attempting to re gulat e prices, control production and rna-
nipulate out put to meet demand. (2) 
British ideas of comb i nati on eventually be gan to 
creep into their philoso phy on a worl d market scale. The 
1. In dustri e s & Politics, Sir ~lfred Mon d , Ma c millian , 
Lon don , 1928, page 299 . 
2 . The British Move me nt f or Industrial Rec ons tru ct ion , 
A. F . Lucas, Quarterly J ournal of E c onomics, Fe bruary 
1 935, page 233 
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le aders of the British in dustry be c ame so firmly e n tre n ched 
in t he ideas of combination that they coul d see no opposi-
tion to dealin g wi th German cartels , ev en those un der Na zi 
control. The result of t h is belief was the Dusse l dorf 
Conference on March 15 and 16, 1939, whereby British and 
German industries agreed to replace competition by co-opera -
tive exploitation of worl d markets. The p l an called for 
c omplete cartelization and it is i n teresting to note how far 
Germany and Britain had g one in the renunciation of compe-
titian by this point. ( See insert of Dusseldorf Agree men t, 
pages 48 throug h 50.) 
We mi ght note tha t at this point England is 
borrowing its new in du strial s c herje from Ge rmany whe reas 
earlier in h istory we have seen that Germany borrowed from 
Englan d . Britain has r e vised a c artelization s c heme some-
what to fit her own habits and traditions. The general 
attitude offered is that it 's all go od for the safety of 
the public, the public we lfare argument, et c. One might 
say that En g l and has taken ove r Germany 's carte l s y stem 
but so far has b e en able to reject its totalitarianism. 
Vhile Germany in borrowin g the mac hine techniQue from 
England learne d to produce me chanical l y with unexampled 
efficiency bu t was ne v e r ab l e to g rasp the necessity for 
subordinatin g machine proc e ss t o human ends . ( l) 
l . Cartels or Competition, Geo . W. Stocking & Myron w. 
ratkins, Twentieth Century Fun d , New York, pa g e 65. 
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An out g rowth of Britain 1 s ne·w order in the period 
of the 1 930 's was . the Imperial Chemical In0ustrie s , a g iant 
c a rtel combine second on ly in po·wer to the g re a t I. G. Farben 
in Germany . Its prog ram for "market stabilization" extend-
ed far beyon d the shores of the British Empire invading 
among other c ountries, Italy , Bel~ium, France and into 
Japan in the East. 
Manipulations were made in the form of output 
restr i ctions, quotas, d ividin g markets, fixin g prices and 
all of the other devices we have dis cus sed before. Some of 
the products brought under c ontrol inc lude alkalies, dye -
stuffs, nitrate, explosives, chlorides , pharma ceuti c a ls, and 
a long list of i mposin g products. One may s peculate as to 
whether or not a cartel system set u p in Britain and the 
Continent may not have had the effect of cons tricting t h e 
c h ann els of investment and retarding the conversions of 
savings into capita l g oods, thus having the effect of 
a ccentuatin g a downward s p iral in general business a c tiv ity. 
By permit tin~ cartel c ontrol of some prices it may be 
ar ·:J; ued that the Britis h are increasing the flexibility of 
other prices. By freezin g one se gment of their e c onomy 
they le ave the door open for more and more control as 
fluctuations a re ma gnifie d in other p arts of the economy. 
Britain in the Present Market 
The l ast elect i on i n Brita in may leave some 
doubts as to whether Bri tain will now continue a lon g the 
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road of combination or be g in to return to their long di s-
carded philosophy of free competition . 
Britain is now in a position where their forei gn 
assets have been drained of f by the par t icipation in a 
second world war. Britain must produce and sell to contin-
ue a s a world power. Tie-ups in cartelized industries can 
only hamper their efforts to re ga in an important place in 
the world market. (1) 
Britain's job now is to lower cost a n d increase 
production. They must expand into new mark ets. However, 
we must re main cogniza.nt of the fact tha t Brit is h business-
men even if r e leased from the bound s of the labor g overn-
ment's socialized policies woul d probably hesitate to g o 
ba c k into a completely competitive situation. A p r omi-
nent British sp ok esman in 194 3 gave evi den ce that there 
was still strong inclination for the combination movement 
within the Isles. (2) 
British businessmen still believe that there are 
many ben efits to be had from cartelization pro gram. They 
d o not a ppear willing to throw themselves open to a free 
competitive market an d therefore, there does not a p pear to 
be any way in which they can expect, log ically, to receive 
the benefit s that mi ght be derived from free competition. 
1. The Economist, Lond on , J anuary 8, 1944, pa ge 33 
2. Combines & Cartels , The Sunday Times, London, 
July 25, 1943 , page 4. 
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SUIVIM A.RY 
Great Britain was the first home of free compe-
tition in the world. As a result of this she accummulated 
a large amount of capital which we nt into both interns.l and 
forei gn invest men t channels. Accompany in g all this was a 
general rise in the Bri tis h standard of living throu ghout 
the Isles. 
Following 1N orl d !l! ar One Britain was not willing 
to acce p t the short run dis comforts of a changin g market 
situation therefore, she turned to a short run relief 
program part of which layed in the continental cartelization 
movement . She be gan to c omb ine wi th C~ rmany and other 
in dustrial nations in standard cartel agreements whi ch we 
have dis cussed in full . The result of al l this was a 
temporary boost from the doldrums of a slump ing per iod but 
a t the s ame time it has shown tbat the lon g run disadvantage 
will be detrimenta l to the country. 
Cartelization at the very best c an on ly give 
Britain a fe~ short run boosts wh ile the long run effect 
to t his industr ia l nation is boun d to be a drag . 
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THE TEXT OF TI-i""E DUSSELDORF AGREE~!lE1'Fl1 
16th March, 1939 
Joint Declaration b y the Reichs gruppe Industrie and the 
Federation of British Industries on the Results of the 
Convention Held at Dusse ldorf, 15th and 16th March, 1939 
The Reichsgruppe In dustria and the Federation of Bri tish 
Industries , having concluded a g eneral discussion on An g lo-
Ge rman trade relations, issue the followin g agreed statement: 
1. The t wo or ganisations welcome the opportunity which 
these d iscussions have g iven of developin r, still further the 
friendly relations which have existed between the ~a b o d ies 
for so many years. 
2. The t wo or ganisations recognise that bath for 
Germany and for Great Britain a substantia l and p r ofitable 
exoort trade is vital to t heir economic life. 
3 . The t wo organisations reco~nise tha t the object of 
th i s exp ort trade must be to g ive e mp l oyment to their 
pe ople, to improve their standard of livin g , and to provide 
a volume of foreign c urrency sufficient for their econ omic 
needs. 
4 . The t wo bodies are agreed th a t the objective to be 
a ttained is that the exp ort of all countries shoul d be 
conducted in such a way as to ensure a fair return for the 
pro ducers of those countries . Hence it is a gr eed that it 
is essential to re p l a ce destructive competition wherever it 
may be fo un d by constructive c o-ope r a t ic , desi ~ned to 
foster the expansion of world trade, to the mutua l benefit 
of Great Brit a in, Ge rmany an d a ll other countries. 
5. The t wo organisations are a greed that it is 
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desirable tha t in d ividual in dustries in oa th countries s t ould 
en deavor to arrive a t in dustrial a greements whic h wil l 
elimin ate destructive compet ition, wherever occurr in g , but 
p rices must be fix e d at su ch a level a s n o t to diminish the 
buying power of the consumers. 
6. The t wo organisations realise that agreements u p on 
prices or oth er factors be t ween Germany a n d Great Britain 
are only a ste p , althoug h a most important step, towar d a 
more ordere d system of world trade. They wou l d welcome the 
participation of other nations in such a gre ements. 
7. The two organ isations are of the op inion tha t ne g o-
tiations sh oul d be starte d immediately be t ween tho se in dustries 
which are alread y or ga ni sed for t he purp ose. They a re further 
~- , 
a g reed that the wider t he area of s u c h agreements , both a s 
to industries and countries, the more rapidly will inter-
national t rade be established on a perman entl y progres s ive 
and profitable b a sis . 
8. The t .- o organisations realise that in ce rtain cases 
t h e advantages of ~ greements betwe en the indu st ri es of two 
c ountries or of a group of countries may be nullified ~y 
competition fr om the industry in some other country that 
refuses to become a p arty t o the agreement. In such cir-
cumstances i t may be necessary for the organisati on s to 
obtain the h el p of their Governments and the two organisa -
tions a gree t o coll a borate in seeking that help . 
9. The t wo organisations a gree that it is their obje c-
tive to ens ·ur e tha t a s a result of an agreement between 
their in dustries unhealthy competition shall be re moved. 
Their aim is to secure as complete co-ope r ation as possible 
throu g hou t the in dustria l structure of t heir res pect i ve 
countries. 
10. The t wo organisations have agreed to use t heir best 
en deavours to promote a n d fos ter ne g otiations between 
in d iv i dual in dustries in their respective c ountr ie s. They 
are encourag e d in tllis task ow ing to t he fa ct that a consid-
erable number of agreements betwee n i n dividual German and 
British industrial grou ps are already in existen c e . The~e 
is thus available a l arge body of experience which inspires 
confi den c e that an immediate extension of this pol icy is 
bo th pract i cable and a dvantageous. 
They are g l ad t o state that a pproxi mate l y a further 50 
in dustr i al g roup s have a lready signified their will in gness 
in pr i ncip l e to ne g otiate at an early d a t e . 
They a l so re p ort wit h s atisfac tion that ne g otia tion s 
h a ve already b een started a nd are now taking p l ace between 
10 industriql groups. 
11. I n conc lusion , the Reichs grup pe In dustria and the 
Federa tion of Br i tis h In dustries feel s tha tthe p~ oblem i s 
not mer e ly one of el i minat ing un desirable competit ion, but 
of taking c on c rete ste p s t o increase world cons u mp tion of 
the products in ' hich Germa n and British industr y a re inter-
e s te d . They have , therefore , decided to mainta in closer 
an d more active rela t i ons with reg ard to this matter. They 
a l so re comm en d to i nd ividu a l in dustries that a n effort 
s h oul d be made in a n y a g reements that may b e c oncluded for 
joint a c tion to in crease wo r l d c onsump tion of the pro ducts 
in which they a re in terested . Aga in, t h is joint a c tion 
should be c onsidere d as the pre c u rs or to a wider i n terna-
tional collaboration between industries desi~ned with a 
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view to increasin g world c 8nsump tion ~nd con sequent l y 
pr oduct ion , to the enefit of all c oncerned . 
12. The ultimate obje c tive mus t be to increase world 
prosperity . The Peicbs gruppe In du s t rie an d the Federation 
of British In dustri es believe tha t the re sult of their 
discussions has be en to l ay a soun d foundation u p on wh ich 
in d ividua l in dustries ca n usefully be g in with mutual 
ad vantage . 
In order to ensure the success of this policy it has 
been agreed between t he Reichs gru p pe In du stria and t he 
Fed eration of British In dus tries to form a Standing 
Co mmi ttee of the t wo or ganisation s , which will meet 
re gularly to review progres s. The Federation of British 
In dustries have in v i~ed the German member~ of this joint 
committee to pay a visit to En g l and in June for this 
purpose , a nd this invita tion has been a cce p ted by their 
German col leagues. (1) 
1. International Carte ls, Ervin Hexn er, Univ . of 
North Carolina Pres s , 1945 , pages 402 - 404 
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Chapter III 
STUDIES OF GERM ~N C.II.RTELS 
Steel 
Bac kpround t o the F1rst International S teel Cartel 
In the period of the early 1900 1 s leading up t o 
Worl d War One, steel production in all the l arge European 
c ountries was i ncreasing at a very rapi d pace. It is 
estimate d that steel capaci ty was being increased about 
50 per cent eve ry ten years during this period. Before 
World Wa r One there were in ternati onal steel cartels 
amon g the several European countries but they were inef-
fectual and l imited i n their scope as control was focused 
on a sing le c ommodity. (1) 
\~. hen 1/ll orl d V! ar One broke out Germany expanded its 
steel cap a city to me et wartime needs. Their raw materials 
were supplied primaril y from the coal in dustri e s of t he 
Ruhr and the ore f Rcilities of the Lorraine area . These 
two a re a s e n gaged i n a full ran e e of activity that turned 
ore int o stee l; the Lorraine area s pecial1zing in p i g iron 
an d heavy steel, the Ruhr c oke, steel an d finished pro ducts. 
Ruhr coal, unexcelled for its coking qual ities , move d as 
c oke f rom the Ruhr to the blast furnac es in the Lorraine 
area. On the r eturn trip pi g iron , as we ll as s ome ore 
woul d move from the Lorraine a rea to the s teel plants of 
the Ruhr . 
1. In te r national Cartels , Erv in Hexner, Univ. of North 
Carolina Press, 1945, page 206. 
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Un der the Tr e aty of Ve rsailles Germany lost the 
whole Lorraine an d Upper f i l esian sectors of its steel 
in dustry and relinquished ter r itory a cc ounting for betwe e n 
75 and 8 5 per cent of its blast furna c e c a pa c ity, about 45 
per cent of its pig iron production a nd a b out 25 p er ce n t 
of its r oll in g mill capacity . The most seri ous blow ras 
t h e l oss of t he ore deposits of the Als a c e-Lor raine to gether 
with 65 blast furnaces and 9 s t eel works. Other European 
c ountries ( Franc e , Be l g ium, a n d Poland) were greatly 
stren p thened by the eff e c ts of the Treaty a s many of the 
plants and areas remov ed from German control were of the 
most modern in the world. Germany ' s en tire equilibrium was 
upset by the terms of t he Treaty. (l) 
I n an att e mp t t o g et ba c k into t he h eav y in dustry 
t h e German g overnmen t be gan a system of i nd e mnifyin g former 
German owners for their l osses of p lant and property , but 
as a qualifyin g requ isite de man din g that the new f u n ds mad e 
available by the g ov e rnment be u se d in re-establish i n g a 
new stee l in dustry . With this g overnment stimulation , a 
new German steel emp ire be gan to deve lop. (2) 
The German infl ationar y s p iral followin g Worl d 
Var One may a ls o have had its effe c ts on the r a p id 
1. Cartels In rtction , Geo . W. Stocking & Myron ~: . Watkins 
Twentieth Century Fund , New York , 1947, pages 17 3-174 
2. The Rationalization Movement i n German Industry, 
Robert A. Brady, Universi t y of California Press, 
Berk eley , 19~ Z , pa ges 1 0 3-1 07 
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e xpansion of in dustry. Many in dustrialists fe a rin g a 
collapse of purchasin g p~wer rapidly turned any liq uid 
hol din g s they may have had int o phy sical form. Many of 
these moves were made a ga i nst goo d business proce dure. 
During this ra pid expan din g pe riod ama l ga ma tions be gan to 
form which were furth e r continued un der the Dawes Pl an for 
stabilizing the banking syste m in 1924. The combination s 
we re generally internal in nature an d aimed at removing 
r i s k from the p icture. 
In 1 926 the Verein ig te Stahlwerke A. G. wa s 
organized by mergin g the prope rtie s of four of Germany ' s 
largest ste el companies . It controlled rou ghly 5 0 pe r cent 
of the principle steel products manufactur ed within Ge rmany 
and toge ther with five other comb ines: Friedrich Kru pp A. G., 
the Gutehoff nungshutte Oberhausen A. G., the Has ch E isen 
un d S tahlwerk e A. . G., the Klec kn er V erk e ~ . • G., and the 
Mannesmann Rohrenv1erke, controlled most of the general 
output of iron a n d steel produ ct s . (l) 
Much of the German expansion, the moderni zation 
of existing pl a n ts a n d equipment, impr ove d l ay outs, new 
c onst ruct ion, r eplacement of obsoles cent equipment , e t c., 
wa s financed by American investment . While Germany's 
indebtedness continue d to climb through t he period o f the 
t wen ties, they continually plowe d their earnings bac k into 
p l ant. 
1. Cartels I n Action , Geo. 1; . Stocking & Myron w. 1JI.ia tkins, 
Twentie th Century Fun d , New Yo r k , 1947, pag es 173-174 
Through the early twenties Germany had pre vented 
any great lon g ran ge c ompetitive price drop s by the use of 
domes tic cartels. They paid 5 or 6 per ce nt dividends to 
pr oducers and were averaging 8 or 9 per cent on capital 
stock. They were increasin g their position commercia lly 
an d had a fi r m control over the d omestic market. Non-cartel 
members were either forced into line or bought out : uring 
this per iod of domestic seizure. 
In 1 925 and ear l y 1926, the German producers 
~uddenly foun d themselves in a p osition of having satu-
rate d the domestic market at the cartel prices an d were 
bein g forced to cu t bac k production. Many p lants were 
ope rating at ab Jut 7 0 per cen t c~pacity. Th i s did not fit 
in with the German states steel p l a n for rec ap ture of 
world export markets . 
The First International Steel Cartel 
On September 30 , 1926, Germany joined with Luxem-
bur g , Belg ium, France and the Czar in the formation of the 
first comprehen sive Int e rnationa l Steel Cartel con trolling 
all semi-finished and finishe d pr o ducts. Germany beca use 
of her f amiliarity with cartel producers in steel on a 
domes tic level, wa s a l eader in the formation of this group. 
(1) . The basis of this first cartel was quota allo tments 
with penalties for those members who mi gh t violate their 
1. The International Ste el Cartel, Univ. of North 
Car olina Press , Chapel Hill , 1943, pafes 69 - 71 
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allowe d pr oduction . Ge rmany 1 s qu ota vvas 40 . 45 per cent 
of t heir r e l a tive product i on durin g t he first quarter of 
1 926. A joint committee had be en s et u p by the partici-
patin g g roup s to determin e quar t erl y the ton na ge to be 
produ ce d by the members. 
It i s interesting to no t e the nationalistic 
charactP.r of the c a rtel a g reemen t fo r a cc ording to the 
strict l anguage the 1t country 11 tha t exce eded its quota wa s 
to pay the fine. The f in e was levied a t ~4 . per met ric ton 
in e x c ess of quo ta ( Ar ticle 6). If any fell s h or t of its 
allowable production the car tel woul d pay its nati ~nal 
group $ 2. a metric ton to a deficit of 1 0 pe r ce nt of i t s 
a llowabl e production ( Article 7). The agreemen t fur ther 
required members to pay into the c ommon f un d $1. f or every 
met ric t on of steel produced ( rticle 1). After deducting 
general expe ns es the cartel liquida ted t he common fund 
semi-annual l y . I t dis tributed am ong its members in pro-
p or t ion t o t he ir a ctual produc tion an amount e qual to the 
total tonna ~ e payments for the 6 months. The rema inder 
was d istributed in proport i on to members qu otas ( ~rtic le 8 ). 
Under this arr an ge men t a por tion for t he penalt i es f or 
over pro du ct ion mi ght b e re pai d to t he violators. (1) 
~ ith mounting deman d s for s t eel in the inter -
national marke t takin? p l a ce i n the l ate t wenties 
1. Ca rtels I n Acti on , Geo . \11 • S toc k i n g & My r on 1:~: . ra tkins 
Twentieth Century Fund , New York , 1947, pag es 182-185 
International Cart e ls, E rv i n Hexner, Univ. of North 
Ca r olina Pres s , 1 945 , pages 208 - 209 . 
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production quotas were raised from time to time. Germany 
continually exceeded their quotas and fines we re levied 
against them ; finally bringin ~ about a test of strength when 
Germany demanded that her quotas be raised and fines re-
du ced or they would leave the cartel . ~f ter a period of 
short ne gotiation on the matter the cartel acquiesced to 
the Ge rman demands. 
As the depression a pproached, Germany became 
dissatisfied with the limiting eff ects of the cartel and 
renou nced the agr:eement on Iv'Iay 1, 1929 . The depression 
which followed r a p i d ly over the period of the next year 
c aused prices to drop to low ebbs finally wrec k ing the 
e n tire cartel a nd it became non - existent . After a period 
of uncontrol l ed international a ctivity caus ed much out-
right competitive action i n world steel, forced prices down 
and threatened many hi gh cost German producers, the German 
g overnment joined the new formin g second steel cartel. 
The Second International Steel Cartel 
With the formati on of the se c ond steel car tel 
the Ge r man g overnment be ga n a policy of solid ify in g the 
entire German steel in dustry . It bought out what few 
remaining industries were still a ctive i n the domestic 
market and merged them in with the le adin g domestic cartel. 
Germany paid many times the m r k et price of the stock to 
buy out the independe nt s . Accord in g to Bruno 1 olff dis cus-
sing the purchase of one Germa n company by the g overnment: 
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" The g ove rnment paid at a rate of abou t 90 pe r 
cent for a pproximately 110 Gelsenkirschener 
shares on a day when the Gelsenkirschener s hares 
we re valued at 22 pe r c e n t on the stock 
market. " (1) -
As the Na zi Party took over the German government 
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i n 1933 , e v en c l oser relations be twee n the German s t ee 1 
indu s try and the Ge r man g ov ernme nt b e gan to t ake p l a ce. 
Many leadi n g German i ndustrialists we re g r a tified at the 
se izure of t he g overnment by the Nazis as they believed 
t h is woul d stren r then their p osition in the international 
c arte l: 
1~avering g overnments have b e en re p laced by a firm 
s tate l eaders hj p . To gethe r wi th peac e qn d order 
also confiden ce has b e e n establish e d and thus the 
basis for a re c overy of our e c onomic s y stem. 
With that the movement has c ome for t he realiza-
tion of all me as ures which form the basis for 
the f u ture organi c de velopmen t of our industrial 
relat i onship . We c an , t herefore , today submit 
to you for deter mina tion the plan for the con sol-
idati on of t he foun der c ompanies: Ge l s e nkirs chener , 
Ph oen i x , Van der Zypen an d Bereinig te Stahl -
werke •.•• whi c h has been s o careful l y p repared 
an d examined in a ll details that it wi l l work 
out favorably not only for our c ompany bu t for 
t h e Ge rman e c onomic system as we ll. " ( 2 ) 
The abo ve quotati on from one of the German 
l eadin g industrialists, Dr. ~lbert Vogler, surmizes the 
a ttit u de of ma ny of t he C~ rman business l eader s a t that 
t ime . ~ s t he program expan ded , s t e el be c ame a quas i - pu b lic 
1 . The E c on omi st, London , June 25 , 1 9 32 , page 140 . 
2. S c ientif ic an d Te c hnical Mobilization, Hearing s be fore 
a Subcommittee on t he Committee of Mi l itary ~ffa irs , 
U . S . Senate , 78th Con g re ss , Se c ond Session, p . to s. 
re c . 1 07, pt. XVIJ page 1 971 
institution. Let it not be for g otten during this period 
tbat the German st a te was a l so in the preparation of 
build in ~ a war time economy. Its in dustrial representa-
tives abroad were now a c tual l y g overnment officials. 
Cartel a g ree ments · ·i th forei gn c ountries now 
be -an to h ave the hand of p ol itical intrigue mixed u p i n 
them as Germany be gan try ing t o block industrial de velopment 
abroad. . tvw fold purp ose one of improving Germany 1 s 
p osition in t he st e el markets of tbe worl d an d se c ondly 
secu ring and forestal lin g the development of potent i al 
enemy country's basi c industries became of uttermost impor-
tanc e. An example of this is illustrated by a maneuver in 
1938 of the r e presentatives in the international cartel of 
attempting to prevent the establishment of a sheet mill in 
Gree ce an a at the same·t i me a t tempting to prevent other 
group s in the cartel from selling semi-finished steel to 
Greek buyers. Foreign exchang e was brou ght under politi c al 
control and the go vernment forced German~ exp orters of steel 
' 
t o carr y out a greements on a barter basis with forei gn 
enterprises . 
Foreign awareness of the German purpose is illus-
trate d by an article in the Iron and Stee l Revie w. ~ 
Britis h member of the Dusse l dorf a greement reported: 
"Ge rmany's success i n expa ndin g her iron and 
steel exp ort trade has caused some difficulty 
as she bas exceeded her quotas in the inter-
national comptoirs •.•. the other me mbers of the 
c ontinen tal steel c ar tel are not unnaturally 
apprehensive regardin g t he use ma de b y Germany 
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of t he primitive meth od of barter , whi c h has 
been increas i n g l y pu rsued durin g the past 12 
montbs. 11 (1) 
In the same pub l i cati on a year later f ur ther ind i cation was 
g iven as t o t he world 1 s know l ed ge of Ge rman movements, ,_.vhe n 
it was pointe d out that Ge rmany ' s use of the bart er system 
has been aimed at encourag in g export of steel only in so 
far a s they result in the importa ti on of vita l materia l s at 
reasonable pri ces . 
Obviously the German particJpation in the cartel 
at thi s time wa s only as a power b l oc k to impr ove the 
d e ve lopment of the German war ma c hine. As the war gre w 
close and · Germa ny withdrew their sup pl ies of steel from 
the v'orl d market for the p urposes of stoc k piling they 
took advantage of the car t el c lause whi c h permitted pay-
ment by other na t ional g roup s to t he member wh i ch had not 
exp orted more than their a l l ot e d t onnage. Mhile it wa s 
apparent why Germany was not exporting at this time c arte l 
members a c quie s c e d to the German re quest. 
THE INC .!\NDE SCENT ELE CTRI C LAI1'iP CARTEL 
Before World War On e Germany had be c ome the 
leading prod u c er and ex p orter of incande scent lamps in 
Euro pe. Germany had entered t h e market throu gh the grant -
ing of patent licenses to the German General Ele c tri c 
(A l l gemeine E lektrizitats Gesells c haft) by the Ed i s on 
1 . Germany an d the I ron and S t ee l I n dustry i n 1 9 34 , 
I ron and Coal Tr ad e s Review , London, January 11, 
1 935 , Volume CXXX , page 90 
~ I 
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Cont i nental Company of Paris in 1881. German Edison bad 
subsequentl y agreed to share the s e pa tent ri ghts with 
Siemens an d Halske a rival manufacturer. The action of the 
German company led to a break in 1887 with Edison Continen-
tal and vig orous price c ompetition resulted. Out of the 
struggle three Ge rman companies emerg ed Allgemeine 
E lek trizitats Ge sellschaft, Siemens a nd Halske, and 
Du tsche Gas gl uhlicht gesellschaft. (1) 
In 1903 Germany joined the first se mbla n ce of a 
c ar tel in this fiel d . Ho~ ev e r, it was not effective and 
went out of bein g a long about 1914. During this period 
increasin g use of incandescent lamps bad led to expansion 
a nd technological improve ment throughout the fiel d . Much 
un certainty as to patent rights developed but in 191 7 when 
the German countries u pheld the tun gsten wire - drawing 
patent a p recedent was establishe d . Th e y be gan to push 
competition out • In the same year another gr oup of p ro-
ducers manufacturing by the use of crystal filament banded 
together into a price fixin g carte l to fi ght the patent 
advantage granted by the German government. (2) 
lt the end of Worl d War One, a centralization 
movement of German in dustry was tak in g p l a ce internally and 
at the same time the gov ernment was encouraf ing i ndustries 
1. Cartels In Action, Geo. W. S tockin g & Myron W. Watkins, 
Twentieth Century Fun d , New Yo r k , 1947 , pa g es 315-316 
2. League of Nations, Re view of E conomic ~spects of 
Se veral International In dustrial Agreements, Geneva, 
1930, page 68. 
to recapture or reopen worl d markets. The re maining pro-
ducers of incandescent lamps in Germany now ban ded together 
into a sin g le enterprise p ooling a ll patents, inventories, 
technical experience, s a les or ganiza ti ons, etc. Actually 
the consolidat~on took the form of a busine s s par tners hip 
with the a dvan tage of a limi ted liability ( a s pe r mit ted by 
German law). ~i t h control co mpletely tightened in the 
d omestic mark et Germany now turned to the world market. 
As Germany re-entered the world market they we re 
encountered by increased comp etition from forei gn producers 
(many of these compan ies bein g their own pre - war subsidi-
aries) and found themselves fa c ed with many high pro tective 
tariffs. Rather than buck this competition Germany began 
to establish subsidiaries once more in forei gn territories 
(Cze chos l ovakia, Sweden, Poland, Switzerland and Austria ) . 
A serious case of market over-capac ity was being increased 
while at the same time t echnological improvement was 
increasing t he ratio of fixe cost to variable cost making 
it a p oarent what mi ght ha poen should the producers be 
thrown to the mercy of unrestricted mark ets . (1) 
It be c ame increasin g ly clear that the market for 
incandes c ent lamps was of an inelastic nature; factors 
remainin g stable , de c reasing prices would not be accompanied 
by proportionate increases in expenditures for the product . 
1. Carte l s In Ac tion , Ge o . W. Stoc king & Myron 1 r . Watkins, 
Twentieth Centur y Fun d , New York , 1 947 , pages 322-325 
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Germany ' s domestic carte l wa s takin g a lead in the stabiliz-
in g of European market p r i ces. In 1921 under their leader-
ship a temp orary cartel came into bein g for price re gulatin g 
but broke nown rather quick ly. Germany immediately set to 
the task of developin p a new and stronger international 
tieup . 0n De ce mber 20, 1924 the agreemen t was finall y 
signed p rimarily throu gh the a ggre s sive efforts of the Ger-
man domestic cartel Osram. The new cartel was to operate 
out of Switzerland headquarters calle d the Phoebus Indus-
tria l Company for the Development of Light. (1) The member 
countries attending the convention were the Ne therlands , 
Germany, France, United Kingd om, Italy, Hun gary, Bel g ium, 
Czechoslovakia, Japan, Denmark, Austria , Sweden, Switzer-
land, Spain , Brazil, China, Poland an d perhaps others. (2) 
The major function of the cartel was the exchange 
of patents an d technolog ical information, an d the divi sion 
of markets . The wording of the ca rtel a greemen t contained 
the followin g: 
11 The aim and pur p ose of t hi s a gree ment is to 
se cure the co-operation of all contra cting 
parties in order to insure a more profitable use 
of t heir manufacturin g facilities in the pro-
du c tion of bulbs, to secure and sustain an 
equally h i gh quality of bulbs, to increase in 
pr ofits in distribu t ion , to increase the 
l. League of Nations, Review of Economic ~spec ts of 
Several International In dustrial Agree ments, 
Geneva, 1930 , p a ge 73. 
2. International Cartels, Ervin Hexner, Univ . of 
l orth Carolina Press, 1945, pag es 358- 359. 
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effectiveness of ele ctri c ligh ts an d to 
increase t he use of l i gh ts for the be nefi ts of 
c onsumers. (l) 
As their share in the international agree ment 
German y retained c omp l e te control of their d omes t i c market 
and was g ranted a small in t ere st in the British overse as 
market p l us a f r a ctional interest in the remainin g markets 
not controlled by d omestic cartel members . There was no 
d irect control over the sales of any member a lthoug h assess -
ments were p l a ce d a gainst t hose members overselling quotas . 
There was much overlap ping of ownershi p in domestic cartels 
with Germany having rights i n General E l e c tric, two Sw i ss 
companies , a Mexi c an c on cern a nd was a membe r of a join t 
se llin g agenc y in Argent ina . The e ffect of the Ge rman 
c arte l on the d omest i c market appears to have been that of 
hol d ing prices above a norma l equilibrium. In 1938 the 
s tyle of three different l amps sol d in the United States for 
about 1 5 cent s whi l e in Ge rmany t hose s ame l amps so l d for 
30 , 36 and 48 c ents res pectively . 
GERMA.N PE1TETRA TION I N PHARHACEUTICALS 
!\.ND HIGH GRADE GA:S OLINES 
It must be p oin ted out tha t much o f Ge rmany 's 
international ca rtel a c tion, particularly after 1930 , wa s 
a maze of intertwined c ontr a c ts a ll un der one d om i nating 
l. Carte ls In Action, Ge o. 1 1 . S t oc king & Myr on "'N . Vfatkins , 
Twentieth Century Fund , New York , 1947, page 335 
- I 
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con trol and with several compara tively smal ler opponents . 
In the field of chemicals including munitions, photography , 
et c., c~rmany 's interna ti ona l par tic ipa tion a ll c ame under 
the combi ne of I. G. Farben . Farben was a g i gantic 
in dustrial oc t u pus who spread tentacles throughout the 
Wes tern World for t he purpose of creating a d ominant 
German state . This section will only p oin t to s ome areas 
of direct pene tra tion while i n the next section we will 
attemp t to s how a n instance of t he over l a nping t ha t make s 
analysis diffi c ult. (1 ) 
Pharma ceut icals 
Pri or to World War One Germa ny t hrough its pa r en t 
company Bayer of Le verkusen had gained control, throur-h the 
fo r mation of subs i d iaries, of the worl d ' s pharmaceutica l 
ma r ke t. ~t the end of World War On e the l ien Custodian s 
Commission c onf s e a te d a ll German pr operty outside its 
borders and pl a ced it for public sale. Through this method 
Germany l ost con t rol along with pa t ent riehts to forei gn 
purchas ers. These purchases , howeve r, l eft much to be 
desired on the part of the pros pective producer. For 
examp l e , in the United S tates the Sterlin g Products Co . 
pu rchased the New Yo r k Bayer in t eres t f r om the Alien Property 
Custodian i n 1 917. Throug h a maze of l e gal en t an gl emen ts 
Bayer of Leverkus en was able to re t ain its most valuable 
1. Germany ha t r ow by Joa chim J oesten , Ziff- Davis 
Publishing Co ., Chic a g o, 1 948 , pa ges 1 77 - 181, 
1 83 - 189. 
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asset, the Baye r c ross, plus the f a c t that the purch~ se did 
not confer clear righ t s or t it l es t o some of the former 
Bayer properties in South America an d the United Kingd om. (1) 
Ar med with the se we a p on s Baye r, now a part of 
t he I . G. comb ine began t o t ake advantage of this posi tion . 
It still bad in its possess ion the prize package in trained 
technicians and know-how . With in le s s than a yea r it 
forced Sterling Prod u cts to agree to pay no less than 5 0 
per cent of its profits on all sales in Lat in America for 
c o- ope r a t ion in the fie l d of te chnical a dv ice , pro ces se s , 
and t he use of the Bayer t rad e mark i n United State s 
marke t s. I n 192 0 pressure was a gain pu t on by Bayer by 
t he thre a t of withhol di ng t e c hni cal advice and S terling 
was for c ed to c on c ede the entire Latin Americ an market i n 
pharma c eu ticals exc ep t for the sale of asp irin for whi c h it 
a greed to give u p 75 pe r c ent of it s pr ofits. ( 2) 
I n 1 923 Bayer of Le verku sen obtained the r ights 
to half the profits of the Wi n throp Ch emical Company a 
Sterling subsidiary produ c in g ethical dr ugs . I n exchange 
f or th is interest Baye r a g reed to lea ve the Uni ted St ate s 
an d Canadi a n marke t s exc l u s:"Lve l y t o Wi n throp. The German 
cartel a ls o was able to re gain c ontrol of one-hal f the 
profits of a British subsidiary of S terl ing 'Jirhich was 
1 . Internati onal Cartels, •rvin Hexner, Univ. of North 
Ca rolina Pres s , 1945 , pa ge 332. 
2 . Cart e l s I n Action , Ge o . lN . Stocki ng & Myron ~~.r . 
Watkins , Tvve ntieth Ce n tury Fu nd , New York , 1947 , 
pages 472 - 47 3 . 
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making use of the 3aye r trade mark i n the British marke t. 
In 1926 the Germans pushed in further by obtainin g full 
con trol of the British subsidiary and b y add i ng more 
produc~s to t he re g ulating agreement. (1) 
The I. G. combine furt h er expanded by s ign ing 
agreements wi t h compan ies in ustria , and an independent 
ph a rmaceutical co mpany in Germany itself, b oth of which it 
later obtained c ontrol of: t he agree ments t ak ing the form 
of a g enc y contracts relating to t he terr i tories of the 
Un ited S tates and its de pende n c ies and se c ondl y a ll other 
foreign terr itories. ( 2 ) 
By 1937 it has b een substant ia ted, in Hea rin g s 
before t he Se curit y and Exc hang e Commission , that I . G. had 
pene trated t h e finan cial stru cture of Sterl ing Prod u cts 
itsel f . So c lose was the tieup tha t in 1939 when the 
Britis h blockade cu t of f d ir e ct German shipments to South 
Ame ri can market s , Sterling a g reed to have ~ inthrop ship 
unlabe lled phar maceuti cals t o I. G. 1 s South Am~ rican a gents,· 
I. G. was t hus a ble to protect its g ood will i n t he South 
t.me rican mar k et b y having these a gents affix and l a bel the 
products a s its own . As l a t e as 1 940 I . G. was stil l 
1. Germany ' s Maste r Pl a n, Jose ph Boikin & Charles A. 
Wel s h , Duel l, Sloane & Pearce, New York , 194 3 
pag es 1 38 - 142. 
2. International Carte ls , E rvin Hexner, Univ. of Nor t h 
Car olina Press , 1945 , page 333 
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being assured by its Ameri can s ubsid iaries that i ts i n ter-
ests were bein g pro tected. (l) 
Hi gh Grade Gasoline 
I n 1935 Germany was anxious to ob t a in from the 
Ethyl Corporation c ertain pr ocesses for the developmen t of 
high octane ~asoline to b e used in mili tary a ircraft. s 
an indu ce ment it approac h ed E thy l with a pa tent exc hange 
p ro p osal i n re lated fiel ds. Ove r t he ob jection of some 
mer ican bus i n e ssmen , and becaus e of the close tieup s between 
I. G. and two of E thyl' s parent compan i es , Standard Oil and 
Gene ra l Motors i n ot her rela te d fields, Ethyl passed to I. 
G . t he d.esired tec hn i ca l i n format-ion. ( 2) 
The overall effect of this maneuver is beginning 
t o come to l i ght on l y now. It h a s be c ome a Dparent that 
~ ithout the pr ocesses obtained i n t his maneuver Ge r many 
woul c have had trouble i n solving mu c h of its high octa ne 
gasoline problem for the wa r time purposes. Plant s 
established throu gh this ca rtel agreement in Germany cut 
short many year s of techn olo g ical resea rch tha t woul d have 
been necessar y to brin g about the a chiev ement . The American 
military g overnment has acknowled ged this fact as being 
1. Corv1i n D . Edward s, E conomi c and Political As p ec t s of 
International Cartels, Monog raph No. l of the Sub-
commit t ee on Milit a r y ffairs, U. S .Senate, 78th 
Con gress, 2nd Ses sion , 1JT ashj_n g ton, 1944 , pa ges 66 -67 
2. Scientific & Technical Mobilization , Hearin g s before 
a Subcommit te e of the Committee on Military Affairs 
U. S . Se nate, 78 th Con gres s , First Sess ion , pt . VI, 
page 939 - 944. 
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re vealed by capture d files of I. G. whi c h have stated that 
I. G.' s a g reements with Ame rican concerns were full y 
approved b y Ge s tap o offi c ials as being justifiab l y nece s-
se.ry for the benefit of the Na zi g ood. ( 1) 
MANIPULATI ONS OF GERMAN ST4.TE CONTROLLED C4.RTELS 
I t is important for us to note the way the state 
c on trolled c artel move ment of Germany i n the period of the 
l ate thir tie s wa s maneuvere d , i gnorin g the economic factors 
present, for p olitica l ex pediency. Germany throu gb its I. 
G. Farben Cor p oration in the che mic a l field, made a g re at 
many separa te a gree me n ts wi th cartels abroad and also many 
a g reements with private c ompanies . 
Germany had been worr ied ab ~ut the invasi on of 
d u Pont into the s yntheti c rubber field wi th a new process 
which might compe te with t he German Buna p rocess. To 
protect themselves an d at the same time attempt to worm the 
du Pont process int o German hands , I. G.approached duPon t 
with a process exc hanging proposition. How ever, du Pont was 
one of the few int e rna t iona l combines wh ich c oul d stand up 
to the German cartel without fea r of sharp re prisal and 
I. G. Farbe~ realizing this, was not too a ggressive in their 
p olicy . However, it became obvi ou s that the y wanted to worm 
t hei r way in to the 4.merican chemi c a l fiel d . 
Wh ile st ill Je a v in g t he offers open to du Pont the y 
approached Standard Oil with a proposal offering Standard 
l. New York Times , October 19, 1945 , pa g e 9 
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amon g other t hings the Buna pr oces s for some of Standard 's 
technical informati on. S tandard immed i ate l y jumped at the 
proposal due to its anxiety of gainin ~ a new l y advan c ed 
hydr ogenation process of making synthe tic gasol ine from 
coal whi ch was controlled by I. G. (l) 
Nov embe r 9 , 1929 I. G. and Standard c on cluded 
agreement whereby S tandard a gre e d to s t ay out of the 
c h emical fie l d and in turn act as the Ame rican representa-
t ive of I. G. and I. G. in general agreein~ to stay ou t of 
the oil fie l d. ( 2) 
The important point is th~ t I. G.continually 
hedged on turning over any syntheti c rubber p roce sse s that 
it c ontrolled despite the a gr eement . 'l'he fa c ts a npear to 
indi c ate th t I. G. stal led first be c aus e the German g overn -
ment prob abl y did not want synthetic rubb er t o ae t out of 
the country an d se c on dl y it bad so ma ny other tieups ¥ith 
du Pont that it did not want t o ca u se any anxiety between 
the t wo cartel s. 
Actual l y in 1935 du Pont and I. G. reached tenta-
tive gentlemen agreemen t s re gardin g s ynthetic rubber 
pro ce sses and although the agree men ts are not clear an d do 
not a ppear t o have bee n carr ied out in any g reat deta il, 
it c an probably b e said that Germany benefitted more be c a u se 
1. Oil, Stab ilization or Conservation by Myron V' . 1 ·ratkins, 
Harper ' s, New York , 1 947 , pa ge 42 
2. Patents , He a ring s Be fore the Committee on Paten ts, 
77th Con gress, 2nd Se ssion , p t. VI , ex. 15, page 2879 
she was able to block any great external development of 
synthetic rubber before the war. I. G. was hampered in 
negotiations with duPont because it is believed that 
d uPont's process was more valuable than that of Germany 
and the purpose of I. G. wa s to f et the process without 
giving up any more than she had to. ~ hile this was not 
accomplished she did much to slow down the de velopment of 
synthetic rubber in the compet:ttive ma r ket . (l) 
Further illustration of the tentacle-like penetra-
tion of Farben are the examples seen through the pe riod of 
the t wenties, ~hen Farben takin r advanta ge of its technolo s -
ically advanced stage in the chemical field continually 
rebuffed duPont ' s efforts for co-operation in many chemical 
enterprises and penet rated directly into the merican market 
by use of paten t licenses, purchasin q in terests, and forming 
subsidiaries in many of the fields •he re they held the 
upper hand . This is apparent in th e dyestuffs in dustry, 
pho tographic supplies and of course phar maceuticals. 
While orig inally these penet r ations may have been 
partial l y made on the basis of economic power thinking , 
there can be little question that after t he capture of 
German e c onomy by the Fascist re g ime that the ca rte lization 
policy be came predi ca te d upon political thinking . 
1. Investiga tions of the National Defense Program, 
Hearing s Before a Special Committee of the U. S . 
Senate , 77th Congress, lst Session , P. to s. re o. 
71, ex. 412, page 4639-4640, 4647 
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Chapter IV 
STUDI ES OF BRITISH CARTELS 
Steal 
Bac kgr ound to British Participa tion 
The effe c t of V. orld Wa r One u p on tbe British 
steel industr, had the result of c ausin g much over-
capacity . The industry h ad be c ome g eared to a high 
level of war time cons tru ct ion and c on t inu ed to increase 
sl i ghtly in t he immediate p ost war era . From 1913 to 
1 927 Bri tish pig iron capa city increased fro m 11 million 
to 12 million tons, crude ste e l from 8 million to 1 2 
million and for g ed product s fr om about 7 mi llion to 
ll or 12 million. 
Foll owing tbe war and past war boom, the 
indus try be gan to fee l a slac k en ing demand and by 1 925 
pig iron produ ction wa s only a t 52 pe r cent of capaci ty 
and stee l in g ots at 61. 5 pe r cent. Post 1 iar European 
consumption of iron an stee l was now below th~t of t he 
best p re . war years a n d the productive c a pacity greatly 
expanded; c ompetiti on became severe and p rice cutting 
was the general practice. (l) 
At the time of the fi rst steel cartel in 1926 
Great Britain a lthough in the throes of depresse d c ondi -
tions did not join. Its e conomi c philoso phy , a lthough 
1. Cartels In Act ion , Geo . 1f, . S tockin f: & Myr on ·w . Tlat k ins 
Twentieth Century Fund , New York , 1947, pages 1 81-182 
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be g inning the per i od of transition , had not ye t reached the 
p oint whe re the pu b li c wou l d a c cept suc h out and out co-
opera tive effort. It is probabl y true t hat t he industry 
as a who l e was not ready for the domestic r e ,e·irnen t ation 
tha t would have b een ne c es s ary f or interna tional 
participation. (1 ) 
Up to this time the British in du stry had tradi-
tionally been built on a small unit b a sis. Its development 
had been the e a rliest in the vv orl d , and it had not shown 
sign s of a cce p tin g the heavy con centrations that marked 
t h e g rowth of t he German market i n t his pe rio d . It was 
yet to fee l the benefits of huge mass produ c t i on a n d had 
t h e detriment of being a c omparativel y hi ~h c ost industry . 
Th e re cognition of the above menti on e d f a c ts a re pointed 
out in the Bal four Commi ttee report r egardin g the c ondition 
of Britis h i ndustries . Aga in in s p e aking of the situat ion, 
t h e Balfour Committee made ment i on of t he uneven expansion 
of c apacity maki ng not e o f waste of gas e s , lac k of ba l ance 
at v arious produ c ti ve stage s, defic i en t cok i n g o f b l a st 
furna c e capacities , and obsolete rollin g mills, steel 
furna c e s , etc. ( 2) I n talking about uneven expansion, 
comparison a s made between the growth of steel in gots, 
wh ich e xpanded about 10 pe r cent in the year s 1 91 3 to 1926 
1. The E conomist, October 2, 1 926, page 539 
2 . Final Re p ort of t he Commi ttee on Indus try a n d Trade , 
( Balfour Committee), London , 1 929, pag es 26 - 27 
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and c a stings which expanded about 50 per cent in the s a me 
p eriod. The industry was fur t h e r burdened by heavy 
cap italization caused by war time inflation and wa s finding 
itself unable to c ompete with the Europe a n p roducers pa r-
ticularly Germany who wa s un derg oing comp l ete domestic 
control enablin g it to pract ice p rice dis crimination and 
ruining competition in the interna ti onal market. Another 
troub l e agg ravating the indus try was the ove r value d British 
pou nd , after the re-establishment of the g old standard. 
By the end of the twenties British imports in 
st e el were showing a sharp i n c rease and e xports were going 
steadily down . As exports de cre ased u nemployment began t o 
seep in. Depressed c onditi ons were foun d throu P:hout the 
world a n d many countries were for ce d off the g ol d standard. 
Britain began to strugg le for their econ omic livelihood. 
The Beginn ing of Control 
On Mar ch l, 1932 Britain be gan i ts first ste p on 
t h e wa y to control in iron a nd steel produ ction by p lac in g 
a 10 per cent imp ort l e vy on all iron a n d s teel products. 
Two months l ater this du ty wa s raised to 32 per cent on 
pi g iron, se mi - finished steel, g i rders, sheets and similar 
items; the duty was raised 20 per cent on finished i te ms. 
For perhaps the first time in history a higher tariff had 
been pl a c ed u p on the import of raw material than u pon the 
finished product in Britain. (l) 
1. Carte l s In Action, Gao. W. S tocking & Myron W. ~ atkins , 
Twentieth Century Fund , New Yo r k , 1947, pag e 194. 
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The pi'ice for its support of the industries 
demanc1 for prote ct .:l. on of the levy ing of duties the Briti sh 
I mport Duties Advisory Committee ( the I DAC), a g overnment 
agen c y organized d urin ~ th i s pe r i od to gu ide the overall 
industrial rejuvenation of British industry, extracted a 
promise from the international committee for t he iron and 
steel industry that they woul d formulate an d execute a 
plan for the reorg an ization of industry . The plan sug -
geste d dra stically suppressed c ompetitive freedom of 
a c tion in the industry and established cartel-lik e a rran ge-
ments to c ontrol the ma rketin g of iron an d st e e l prod ucts. 
The Domesti c Cartel 
Under this plan the British Iron a nd Stee l 
Federation occ upied a key posit i on in the operation struc -
ture . This Federation wa s ma de u 0 of a series of tra de 
associations of producers at the s everal stages and branches 
of st e el pro duction. The ~ss o c i a tions were desi gned as 
inst rumen ts t o effe c t the control of product ion at t h e 
se parate stages within the c ountry. One of the prime 
obje cts wa s to sup port an d co-or d inate t he a c tiv i ties of 
the Associa tions an d to bring about the wi l l of in dustry 
i n ma tter s o f general pol icy extending be y ond the influ-
en ce of one a ssociation. Duties of t he various associa-
ti ons were to f ix minimum pri ces, all oc ate pr odu c tion and 
sales quotas am on g members . The Federati on an d the I DAC 
reviewed a ll price structures se t by the ~ssociation s. 
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Actually the p ower of the Federation and the I D~C was only 
ad visory, but since the I DAC had power over the establish-
ment of tariff rates it virtua lly en joye d a veto . (1) 
To encourage membership in the Associations the 
Federation author ized a p olicy of price dis c rimination by 
permitting members of the Association to grant loyalty 
rebates to c ons umers who constantly pu r chased from associate 
members . In a ctual practice the Federat ion , although 
without le gal pov:er , became so p owerful that it was 
a c tual l y ab l e to b loc k ne • c onst r u ct i on when it deemed it 
ad visa.ble. 
An example of the Federation ' s g rowin p p ower is 
c ited from an in c i dent in 1936 when the Federation refused 
to appr ove a plan for a Bessemer Steel Plant with an annual 
capacity from 350 ,000 to 400 ,000 tons of co- ordinate c apa c -
ity at Jarrow-On-The-Tyneside. Produ cers in the nearby 
Midd lesborou~h area bad opposed the project and it wa s 
finally abandone d . Commen t was made on this by British 
writers showin g t hat they clearly re c ognized what was 
t akin g p lace: 
" The story of J a rrow throws a part icular l y vivid 
lig ht u p on wh ich Britis h industry i s already in 
a strait jac ke t. The fa c ts ought to blow s ky-
high the s trang e delusion of those who believe 
in the 1 s e lf-8 overnment of industry .' The plain 
fa c t is that if an industry is elevated to a 
monopoly it will refuse entry tone¥ comers. 
It will put its own in terest above those of the 
1. Ibid, pages 1 94-195 
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community as a whole . It will exploit the 
market for all its worth. It is an ossifica-
tion of inefficienc y and endowment of 
selfishness. " (l) 
Thou ~b there was some of the above type of think-
in g still remaining in Britain , the IDAC warml y supported 
the entire c ontrol s c heme . lthou e h recognizin p, the p os s i -
b ility that price con trols, quotas, outputs , et c., mi ght 
le ad to many abuses not b eneficial to the pub l ic we lfare , 
the I DAC expressed a view that the Federation had exercised 
its power with a commendable sense of responsibility . It 
be lieve d tha t the subject of official review by the I DAC 
was strong en ou ph to safe guard public interests. They 
stil l held out the evils of mon opoly and spoke in t e rms of 
this con solida tion t akin ~ p l a ce to foster efficienc y a nd 
safe guard the welfare. 
MEMBERSHI P I N I TTERN~TION\L C ~RTEL 
In the meantime the Federation was making rapid 
strides in ga inin g internal control over the entire indtis -
try . On July 31 , 19 :'55, with the sanction of the Br itish 
g overnment it joine d the International Steel Cartel. 
Previous to joining the cartel, argu ment had broken out as 
to what British quotas would be a nd to put the Federation 
i n a b e tter barga ining positi on the I DAC went to Parlia-
ment and had customs duties raised 50 per cent. 
Confronted with this tariff wall that threatened 
1 . The E c onomist, London, July 18, 1936, page 105 
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the loss of the British market to continenta l enterprises, 
the con t inental car t el members acquiesced to the Federation's 
de man d s tha t imports be restricted to 670,000 tons for the 
first year of the agreement and 525,000 tons thereafter. 
These figures compared with the annua l British imports 
rang ing from 881,000 tons to 4 ,406,000 tons during the 
de cade 1921 to 1930. After Par liament had ratified this 
agreement, the Federation inaugurated a further a gree men t 
base d upon a licen sing syste m under which i mp ort duties 
were lowe red 20 per cent on imports with in a n a gre ed quota. 
Import s not coming within the agreed quotas were still 
subject to standard duties of 00-1/3 per ce n t. The Feder-
ation was further granted the p ower to incre ase the volume 
of i mp orts at the preferred r a te should the nee d for 
qdequate supplies for suitable steel fall sh ort. (1) 
The· Federation h ad now a ctua lly become a quasi-
public institution concerned with the p riva te profit 
seeking of a particular se gment of businessmen to effec-
tively control i~p orts and ex ports. The Federation 
organized the British Iron and S teel Corp. Ltd., a s a 
central agency f or the purchase and sale of steel p roducts 
abroad. Th~ corpora tion purchased a ll authorized c ar tel 
imports and then in effect handed the imports bac k to the 
d omesti c cartels for distribution to British consumers; 
1. Cartels In Action, Geo. 1:~ . St oc k ing & Hyr on w . I atkins, 
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1947, pages 196-197 
l 
77. 
conversely it purchased most of the steel for exp ort a n d 
resold it in accordan ce with the cartel a greement. The 
steel cartels form~l operations ended in Se ptember, 1939. 
Rubber 
Need for Control 
The transportation revolution beginnine in the 
early 1900's plus the technical improvements for the use 
of rubber f ootwear led to phenomenal rises in the pri ces 
of rubber around 1910. The natural result of t hese pri ce 
climbs was a rapid expansion of production facilities. 
Most of the output was coming from relatively larg e plants 
in the Far East in which Great Bri tain bad hu ge investments . 
Until 1920 the industry experienced continua l boom periods , 
but with the coming of the busine s s recession in t he 
twe n ties drastic price declines set in. In 1920 the Rubber 
Growers ssociation composed of British plantation companies 
with headquarters in London sought a voluntary restriction 
of 25 per cent output for the ensuin g year. 
Prices failed to respon d because many manufac-
turers were over-inventoried and production outside the 
Association continued to expand. Toward the end of 1921 a 
short price rise be g an to take p l ace an d the outlook 
brig htened somewhat. However, t he Rubber Growers Asso cia-
tion still fearful of what had happened were still think-
in g in terms of restriction an d control . 
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Government Pl annin g · 
On October 24 , 1921 in support of the As socia-
tion 's a 9 peals the Secretary of the Colonies, Mr . Winston 
Churchil l , a ppointed a comnittee, comm only know n as the 
Stevenson Committee, to draft a p lan enforc ing restriction. 
It is probable that this move was more political i n nature 
than economic at the pa rticul a r time. (1) 
The Stevenson Commi ttee sought to obtain the co-
ope ration of the Dutch g overnment in the venture. It was 
believed that with the Dutch producing c apacity coupled 
with the British , the British would control a bout 97 per 
cent of the worl d market; whereas, without the Du tc h 
Britain coul d on l y muster somewhere a round 7 0 per cent. 
However, the Dut c h rebu ffed and on Ma y 19, 1922 t he 
S teve n son Committee advised a gains t attemptin g restriction 
1 i thout their ai d . They we re c on vinced that wi t hout 
Du t ch co-operation no restriction p olicy could be devised 
t o control the market successfully. ( 2) 
The c on tinue d pre s sure of t he Asso c iations 
compelle d the S tevenson Committee to continue ne g otiations 
with t he Dut c h in an att e mpt to bring about control. Littl e 
Dutch co-ope ration wa s expressed a nd due to the Asso c iat ions 
l. Marke ts & Men, J. W. F. Rowe, Mac millan, New York , 
1936 , Chap ter 6 
2. Rubber, Stu dies an d ~rtific ial Cont rol of Raw Material 
Sup plies , J. ~ ~ F . Rowe , Memo No . 29, Royal E conomic 
Society , Lon oon , April, 1931, page 7 
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insistence on October 2, 1922 , the Committee recommended a 
plan based u pon the pro u ct ion of rubber, assigned quotas 
and the re gulation of exports. The p lan became law on 
Novembe r l, 1922. ( l) 
The administratin g body of t he Steven son plan had 
d iscretiona r y p owe r in establishing the quotas . Actually 
they were supposed to be based on actual out put of the year 
ending Oct ober 31, 1 920, but be c ause of p oorly kept re cords 
and l a c k of s tatistical data rather wide dis cretion a s 
used by adm i nistrative a gents in the determina tion of quotas . 
Rivalry developed in the Colonies an d Distri cts 
eac h seeking more favorable positions with relation to 
quotas an d tax benefits provided under t he law. Muc h 
smuggling took plac e and con troversies were large, the 
ca r tel injured the Co lonial government an d lost muc h g ood 
will through the loose interpreta tions of officials and 
inab-ilities to satisfy members . 
Mr . Churchill considered the short run effects 
of the cart el as a great success. It aided the British 
balance of international payments by raising the pri ce of 
an important British Empire export an d helped to offset 
the heavy demand for dollars to meet British import and 
war debt obligations. Howeve~ , it must be noted that the 
plan did not stabilize the market pri ce of rubber and if 
anything l e d to a ccele r ated fluctu a tions a nd further u pset 
1. Ibid , pag e 6. 
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the relation of s u pp l y to demand . 
The p lan l a sted 6 years in al l . During t he first 
year de mand 1;va s reasonab l y steady show ing a slight t endenc y 
to rise, followin g t h is a minor r e c ess i on in demand set in 
in the s prin g of 1 924 foll owe d by a quic c recovery . During 
this period a slight incre a se in exp ort s a l lowed under the 
p lan coupl ed with s ome market manipu l a tion s to keen the 
average p rice for the qu a r t e r fro m rising t o a level which 
~ ould permit re l ease of additional r ubber for ex port brought 
about an a c u te sh ortage. This movement culmina ted in 
July of 1 925 . ( l) 
Pric es durin g t his p eriod , 1 922 to 1925 , we re 
a ct ually continu a l ly riaing , probably du e to the te chno -
log ical developments devised for the use of rubber . At the 
same time it mu s t be noted tha t te c hnolog i c a l developmen t s 
fo r len~thenin g the l i fe of r ubbe r p r odu c ts were a lso 
taking p l a c e . ( 2 ) 
The a b ove d evelopme nts c ou pl ed wi th the strin -
gen c y of s u pply provoked b y t he S tevenson p l a n was causing 
agitat ion in many consumin g coun tries. The cart e l in 
answe r to many pro t ests began to ease a l l price restrict~on s . 
Fr om August 1925 to May 1926 restrictions were eased and 
in September 1925 accumulated stocks were released for 
export r egar dle ss of quota limitation s. The me asures were 
l. Governmen t Con trol of Crude Rubbe r, Cha rles R . 
· ~ hit tlesey , Princeton Universi t y , 1 931, page s 18 1 - 182 
2 . Ibid, page s 35 - 37 
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wholly inadequat e huv1e v er and the shortage ccmtinue d . 
Smu g f ling be ga n t o increase c c using more unrest in the 
p r oduct ive areas. As 1hittlesey observes: 
"~t t~e height of the panic , with buyers clamor-
ing f or more rubber t he quantity of rubbe r 
amounting to 57 ,000 pounds whi ch had been c on -
fiscated by the c ustoms authorities in the 
Middle East wa s burned instead of being 
released for sale. " (l ) ~ 
While in creasing t he al lowab l e e x p orts i n 1926 
the committee chan g ed the genera l provisions p overnin g 
adju stments by raising the p i v otal pri ce near l y 50 per cent 
from 1 5 penc e to 21 pence a pou~d . It has been c ommen ted 
on this move that: 
" The p revious standard of one shi llin e;t three 
pence ha d bee n suffi c iently profitable; the 
new standard meant enormous profits to al l 
producers outs•cte the scheme , anc therefore a 
dire c t incentiv e to the m to increase their 
out put to the g reatest possible extent, which 
they naturally did . Looking back it is hard 
to conceive how such a blunder coul d have been 
mad e b y the British g overnment." (2) 
The market price of rub ber steadil y de clined 
desp ite the drop in producti on. The f i r st atta c k was a 
reduction in the r ate of permitted exports . Three factors 
were probabl y primari l y res p onsible fo r the d i mlnls t in g 
efficien c y of the plan : 
l. The growth of production outside of the 
restricte d areas . 
1. Ibid, page 40 . 
2 . Markets & Men, J. W. F. Rowe , Ma c mil lan, Ne w Yor k 
1936 , page 1 35 . 
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2 . The development of substitutes . 
3 . The defe ction and smugg ling of those inside 
the scheme. 
See Charts A a nd B on pages 87 and 89 f or pictures of pr ice 
situ~tion under c ontrol and change in world market posit ion . 
Other fa c tors were a l so takin g p l a c e synthetic 
rubber was being deve loped in Germany and the United S t ates , 
processes were being foun d for the re clamation of rubber 
both of whi ch bad a depressing effe ct on the cartel's 
abil i ty to hold the marke t. Mu ch wran g l ing of quotas 
c aused discontentment amon g member planters and the 
inabilit y to brin g the smug~ lin g pr oblem under c omplete 
contr ol was we a keninc the carte l day by day . (1) 
I n 1928 the g overnment finally abandoned the 
plan . One of the prime reasons be lieved to be the re s ent-
me nt of the meri can mar ke t who wa s no~ absorbin g a l arge 
p ortion of the out put for us e in its greatly expanded 
automobile i ndus try. 
British Che mi cal Combine s 
Se cond on l y to I. G. Farben in its inf l uence in 
wor l d markets was the development of Imperial Chemical 
Industries . Or ganized and pr omoted under the l eadership 
of Sir Alfred Mon d exponent of t he "new industrial order 
1. Rubber , Studies and Artificial Control of Ra w Materia l 
Supplies , J. W. F . Rowe , Memo No . 29 , Royal Ec on omi c 
So c iety, London , Apri l, 1931, pages 34 - 42 
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for Great Britain. 11 ICI quickly developed complet e control 
of its domestic markets, and unhampered by anti-trust le g is-
lation ent e red the world market in many che mical fields. 
ICI formed cartel a rra n gements in the familiar 
patterns of output restriction, quota s, dividing markets, 
fixin g prices, etc., bringing under car tel-like control 
such products as alkalies, citric acid, calcium carbide, 
dyestu f fs, nitrates, explosives, titanium p i gments, phar-
ma c eu ticals and numerous other products. It formed with 
IG many of t h e chemical comb in es which we have pointed out 
in the chap ter on Germany, in most cases being made a vic-
tim of IG 1 s a ggressive polic ies , although receivin g some 
te c hnical data from IG and receivin g te mporary market 
prote ct ion. It formed agreements with duPont in the 
United States to exchange technical information, g rant 
exclusive licenses, exchan ge of patents present and 
future, etc., for a lon g list of cherrlical p i'o duc ts. It 
became a part of jointly owned selling agreements to 
eliminate competition in such forei gn markets a s Argentina, 
Urugu~y , Brazil and Canada. Unlike Farben it did not 
a ppear to ha ve the mi l itary a ggressiveness in its pattern. 
Imperial Che mical I ndustries a opeared more to be an or gan-
ization to gain the short run ad vantages of business com-
bination as best it could in neither thinkin F in terms of 
lon g run disad vantages nor the motives of combines it 
was connecting with. 
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An examp le of the way in wh ich it was made vic-
tim t o these business like agreements are the patent and 
processes tieups between I CI and duPont through the periods 
of the twenties. Through an involved maze of c a rtel agree-
ments , Germany was able to obtain munitions patents and 
technology dire ctly from duPont and ICI through further 
cartel a rrangements in Sou th ~merican countries notably 
Argentina, Brazil, Pe ru and a fe w others. This was in 
direct violation of the Versailles Treaty whi ch permitted 
Germany no munition s industries after World War One. 
SUM:l'IIARY 
We have seen from t he brief illustrations cited 
that one of the chief problems causing En g lan d to depart 
from their lon g accepted theories of free trade we r e: 
1. Market condit ions and co-operative tieups in 
other countries forcin g them into an unfavorable posi tion 
in wor l d trade. 
2. The increasin g fixed cost ratio to be found 
in a matured industrially developed country caus ing more . 
emphasis to be placed on the elimination of ris~ . 
3 . The effect of the war t ime expansion in the 
heavy in dustries le ad ing to a very quickly arising situa-
tion of over-productive capacity wh ich would have brought 
about sharp f luctuation s had it b een left to natural l aw s 
to bring about equilibrium . 
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En gl a n d 's use of t h e cartel a ppears to be a n 
a cce p t ance of the way thing s were bein g don e at the time . 
She d id not have the s treng th to fi gh t i t a l one nor would 
suc h a fi gh t have b een fruitful ~ur ing the period of the 
l a te t wen t i es a n d throug h the t hirties . 
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CH~RT A 
DU TCE AND BRI'J,ISH RUBBER :E:X PORTS 
1920 - 1940 
YEAR BRI TI SH ( a) DUTCH ( b) 
Long Ton in 
Thousands 
---
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1 927 
1928 
1 929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
232 . 7 
201.9 
274 .2 
254 .9 
24 0 .0 
281 .2 
371 .5 
328.1 
386.6 
569.3 
548 . 3 
511.8 
471 . 9 
533 . 3 
588 .0 
513 . 5 
447.1 
596 . 5 
492.0 
519 . 0 
7 10.0 
% of 
VI orld Total 
68 . 0 
66.9 
67 . 5 
62.3 
56.3 
53.3 
59.7 
54 .1 
59 .1 
66 . 0 
66.7 
64 .1 
66.7 
62 .7 
57.8 
58 . 9 
52.2 
52 .6 
55 .0 
51 .7 
51 . 1 
Continued on Next Page. 
Lon g Ton in 
Thousan ds 
80 . 0 
71.0 
94 .0 
117.0 
149.0 
189.0 
204.0 
2.29 .o 
229.0 
225 . 0 
242.0 
257 . 0 
211 . 0 
282.3 
379.4 
282.9 
309 . 6 
431.6 
300 . 9 
369.9 
537.5 
% of 
World Total 
23 . 4 
23 . 5 
23 . 2 
28.6 
35 .0 
36 .0 
32 . 8 
37 . 7 
35 . 0 
29 .5 
29 . 4 
32 .2 
29.8 
33.2 
37 . 3 
32.4 
36 . 2 
38.0 
33.6 
36.8 
38 . 7 
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Chart A continued 
a : British Malaya, Ceylon, In dia , Burma, North Borneo, 
Savannah 
b: Netherlands East In die s 
Sou rces: G. Rae " s ta tis tics of the Rubber Indus try," 
Journal of the Royal Stat ist ica l Socie t y, 1938, 
Vol CI, pt. II, p. 335; S ir Andrew MacFadyean, 
The History of Rubber Re gulations, 1934-1943, 
Allen & Unwin, Lon don , 1 944 , Table III of 
Statistical Sup plement. 
1 . Cartels In Act ion , Geo . ~ . S toc king & Myron ~ . 
'~1 a tlcins, Twentie th Century Fund, New York, page 72 
88. 
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CHART B 
EX PORTABLE PERCENTAGES, PRI CES, & PRI CE RELATIVES 
OF RUBBER UNDER 'l1l~VENSON PLAN 
PERIOD Exportable 
Percentage 
First Year of Restrictiori 
11-1-22 to 1-31-23 60 
2-1-23 to 4-30-23 60 
5-1-23 to 7-31-23 65 
8 -1-23 to 1 0 - 31-23 60 
Second Year of Restriction 
11-1-23 to 1-31-24 60 
2-1-24 to 4-30-24 60 
5-1-24 to 7-31-24 60 
8 -1-24 to 10- 31 - 24 55 
Third Year of Restriction 
11-1-24 to 1-31-25 
2-1-25 to 4-30-25 
5-1-25 to 7-31-25 
8 -1-25 to 1 0-31-25 
50 
55 
65 
75 
Fourth Year of Restriction 
11-1-25 to 1-31-26 
2 -1-26 to 4-30-26 
5 -1-26 to 7- 31-26 
8-1-26 to 1 0 - 31-26 
85 
100 
100 
100 
Fifth Year of Re striction 
11-1-26 to 
2-1-27 to 
5 -1-27 to 
8 -l-27 to 
1-31-27 
4-30-27 
7-31- 27 
10-31-27 
80 
70 
60 
60 
Sixth Year of Restric tion 
11-1-2'7 to 1-31-28 
2-1-28 to 4-30 -28 
5-1-28 to 7-31-28 
8-1-28 to 10-31 -28 
Continue d on Next Pa~e. 
6 0 
60 
60 
60 
London Aver-
a ge Price 
(in pence) 
14.285 
16.858 
14.242 
14.994 
14.175 
12.917 
10. 974 
14.632 
1'7.998 
19.356 
38 .469 
43.269 
46.709 
28.013 
21.0017 
20.199 
19.265 
19.69'7 
18.165 
16.620 
19.023 
12. 604 
9 .154 
8 .866 
% of 
11-l-22 to 
1-31-23 
average price 
---
100.00 
118.01 
99.70 
104.96 
99.23 
90 .42 
'76.82 
102.43 
125.99 
135.50 
26 9 .23 
302 .90 
326.98 
196.10 
147.02 
141.40 
1 34.86 
13'7.89 
127.16 
116. 35 
133.17 
88 .23 
64.08 
62.0'7 
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Chart B continued 
Sources: Charles R . Whittlesey, Governmental Control Over 
Crude Rubbe r, Princeton University Pres s , Princeton, 
1 921; J. W. F . Rowe, Rubber , Royal E conomic 
Society, London, Apri l 1931. 
1. Cartels In Action, Geo . ~ . Stoc k ing & Myron W. Watkins, 
Twentieth Century Fund, New York , page 69 . 
The Use 
Chapter V 
CONCLUSI ONS 
There appears to be a greement by authorities 
on the fa ct that cartels foun d their birthplace in the 
German economy. Free enterprise bas no historical basis 
in Continental Europe leas t of all in Germany . Germany 's 
industrial development came l ate and fast . The cartel 
concept is as sacred to German businessmen as free enter-
prise to the Amer ican. (1) 
The cartel appears to be a business maneuver of 
the authoritarian type of German thinkin g . In its initial 
stage it is probably a free a s sociation of members of a 
particular indus try; however, the German use woulCl seem to 
indies. te that this freedom is one way , that is, freedom to 
join the cartel; there does not a n pear to be any possibility 
of withdrawin g from the cartel once an enterpriser bas 
entered. 
It can be sald that Germany 1 s use of the carte 1 
ma;y- have are;uments pro and con. Firs t they are anti-social 
and should be suppressed; they have no function to perform. 
Second, they are the result of deeply rooted problem~ and 
since they are a means of adjustment the y cannot be brushed 
aside. (2) 
1. Carte ls Or Competition, Geo. W. Stocking &. Myron 1 ! . 
Watkins , Twent ieth Century Fun d , New York, page 241 
2. America ' s Role in the 1.'/orld Economy, by Alvin H. 
Hansen, W. W. Nor ton & Co., pag e 115 
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Re gardin g the first argument one can always look 
at the violent fluctuations whi ch appear in the business 
cycle, particularly in the heavy good s and basic minera l 
pr oducts, and be inclined to p icture many social benefits 
to be gained from cartelization. However, it must be 
remembered tha t where this bas taken place, for example, in 
t he rubber and steel cartels which we have examined in the 
previous chap t e rs, that bad no control been brought, freely 
competitive forces woul d have raised havoc in those indus-
tries throughout the worl d . However, it must not be for-
g otten that these c on trols were brought to al l eviate a short 
run p roblem a n d throug h the manipulat ions they brou ght about, 
the problem was never solved economically. 
With re gard to argument two, the problem of 
fluctuation has been reco gni z ed but the realization that 
lon g run freely compe tit ive forces woul d brin ~ about an 
automatic a d justment must never be i gnored. The carte l a t 
its very best is no more than a tonic and failur e to heal 
the wound will not cure t he pa tient . If it were pos sible 
to con trol violent cyclic a l fluct ua tions the major c a use 
of ca rtel or ganization wou l d be re moved. (1 ) En gland 
was l ate in acce pt in g the cartel as a means of transacting 
business, its use appears to b e a "last di tch" move of a 
dyin g country to atte mp t salvation , and fi ght o ~ f change. 
England ' s posi tion as a worl d business leader 
1. Ibid, page 150 
92. 
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had been steadily on the de c line since tbe turn of the ce n tury. 
She wa s the originator of the industrial movement and f or 
many y e ars hel d top p osition in the trade worl d . Ge r many 
took the movement from Englan d and a p pe a rs to have made 
rapid strides in overtaking England as a producer. The 
Ge rmans used the ca rt e l concep t a s part of their way of 
d oin g busines s . The English in or der to hold onto t he ir 
position a ppea r s to have acce p te d the car tel be cau s e othe r 
nations we re a cce p t ing it. (l) 
En gland used the cartel as a me a ns of elimina tin g 
t h e ris k conceot invo l ved with their declining position in 
indust r y . Their e quip me nt a n d p l a nts neede d a major over -
haul ana in many cases new p r oducts had to be de vel oped . 
Rather tbs.n ac ce p t t his fa ct or Englan d turned to combines 
on a n international scale as a me a n s of eas in ~ tbe i nciden t 
of economic change. 
Unlike Germany who had long been re g i men te d t o a 
political au t horitarian philosophy, the 3 ri t ish populace 
had to be c onditioned before it wou l d acce p t the ca rtel a s 
a u seful i nst r ument in trade channel s . That perio d came in 
the 1 920 ' s a n d while it c a used no g r eat chan ge in British 
l aw, one coul d note the shif t in emphasis of aims . It now 
b e c ame recognized that t he use of a ca rtel ml ght be in the 
interes t of trade or public we ll-being r~ther than in 
1. Ca rtels: What Shal l ~ e Do About Them? by Milo 
Perkins, Har per ' s November, 1944 , page s 570-578 
restraint of trade as would have been the previous inter-
pretation. (l) 
Cartels appear to have be en used mostly in the 
heavy industries and in the fiel d of basic raw materials. 
Th is type of ind ustry invariab l y is cursed with temp orary 
exc ess capacity. It is customary to bu il c apacity in 
anticipation of peak boom t imes. Heavy amounts of fix ed 
capital and lo~ variable c ost in c reased the c ompl exity of 
the p r oblem . ( 2) The British experience in the rubber 
crisis illus trates the p oint by show in ~ tha t a cartel was 
used after capa c ity had been built up to such an ex tent 
tha t it c ould no longer find profitabl e markets for the 
g oods. High cost of production p l us many compe t itors 
brought the c lamor that a cartel -l ike organ i za tion be put 
into ope r ation t o pro tect inte rests . 
VV e mu st not over l ook the prospect that the use 
of a carte l may not be e c on omi c i n na ture on the part of 
any one. I t can be seen that Germany, particularly u nder 
the Nazi re g ime , used the cartel for pol i tica l purposes in 
b u i l ding their war machine. The cartel was ~mply a mean s 
of assembling streng th to enable the German enterpriser to 
have the u pper hand in ne g oti a ti ons v· ith ·weaker c ombine s 
1 . I nternational Combines , Modern History by 4lfred 
Plu mme r , Sir Isaac Pitman & ~ons , Ltd . , London 
pqge s 230 - 236 
2. America's Ro le in the Worl d Economy by Al vin H. 
Hansen, ~ . V . Norton & Co . , page 119 
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and private en terprises. The German g overnment wa s quite 
willing to hel p i n dus t riali s t s to form car t els and to keep 
the c arte l s fr om fa llin g apart once the y had been f ormed . (l ) 
The c artels in exist e n ce in Na zi Germany bore 
li tt l e resemblan ce to those f reely fo r med organizati ons 
for t he prosecution of peace time business . The y were 
diffe r ent in purpos e , used in a differen t manner ~nd they 
were c er tainly manned by personne l a ltogethe r unsuitable 
for any peac e time use whi ch we coul d afford to permi t . ( 2) 
The E ffe c t of Cartel Programs 
The first obv ious e f fe ct of the movement in b oth 
Germany and Britain was tha t it al lev:i..ated a domesti c mar ket 
probl em i n t he pa rticular industry brought under c ontrol. 
I t mus t be note d however, t hat this c r isis was alleviated 
a t the expense of t he c onsumin g public. A.s we saw in the 
case of incandes c e nt l amps , the Ge r man public was for ced 
to pay the p rice far a bove t hat wh ich appeared in the free 
market . The pric e of lig ht p roducts bein g about twice the 
price of that in t he Uni te d State s market at the s ame 
time. ( 3 ) In t he c ase of Br itish rubber, the price wa s 
artificia lly rai s e d t o the de triment of consumers, 
l . 
2. 
The Nature of the Cartel Proble m by Fritz I'iia chlup , 
A Carte l Po licy fo r the Un ited Na tions, Columbia 
Univ . Pr ess, 1 945 , page 9 
Statu s of Cartels in Post -'~Na r Eur ope , b y Ben r . 
Lewi s , Columb i a Univ . Pre s s , 1945, page 37 
Ca rtels I n Act ion , Geo. W. S toc king ~ Myron W. 
~ a t kin s, Twentie t h Century Fund , New York , 1947 
page 344 . 
encouraging competition from other national sour c es whi ch 
eventually competed a n d injured the p osition of the British 
rubbe r cartel under the S tevenson Plan. (l) 
Ano ther obvi ous eff ect of the c artel is that it 
p rotects and lengthens the life of ma ny industries which 
are in the need of change and unless restriction becomes 
permanent, will h a ve t o face that need sometime in the 
future. The English at the be g inning of their cartel 
move ment reco f:nized the unfavorable position of their 
industry i n a competitive market. The Ba lfour Commi ttee 
re ports recogn ized tha t: . 
"In general produc tion costs were relatively 
high , mass production techniques had not been 
accepted and Britain remained behind .me rica 
and Germany in amal gamation, inte gr a tion and 
modernizat i on of equipment. " ( 2) 
Ra ther than fa ce the compet it ive way of bringin g about 
re- ad justment of these unec onomic factors, Britain chose 
to mo ve in to the worl cl cartel p icture an a in some cases, for 
a short run pe r iod , ~leviate d t h e problem. How ever, i t 
must be noted that the problem has not be e n removed; it is 
still present and in some in dustries En g lan d is fa c in g it 
at the present time . 
In talkin g of the effect of cartels one must never 
i gnore the prospect that cartel manipulation may build u p 
1. Mar ke ts & lv'Ien, J. W. F . Rowe, Macmillan, New Yorll; 
1936, page 1 35 . 
2. Price and Production Control in British In dus try, 
by Be n Lewis, Un iversity of Chi c ago ~re ss , 1937, 
page 3 . 
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an economy for a ggressive maneuvers. This, of course, is 
true in the case of Germany who u sed I . G. Farben combines 
for the stock piling of many of the vital materials of war 
that she either did not have or had not developed t~ suffi-
cient status. The Farben combines undoubtedly were very 
powerful in building u p Germany's war potential. (1) 
Summary 
The Se cond World War and the pre ced ing period 
of political tension have not a ided in makin g cartel dis-
cussion more dispassionate or less involved. Economic 
warfare has exercised great influence u p on its problem. 
The German government has looke d upon all international 
economic mechanisms as instPuments v.ritb vhich to increase 
its vvar patent ial and to weal{en its future adversaries. 
The particular prob lem of p reventin g German political 
penetration under the guise of e c onomic intercourse is 
frequently connected with discussion of the much broader 
problem related to the ge neral desirability of international 
cartels . Many re gard the cartel s p irit of entrepreneurs 
as an a n ti-democratic feature of German ori g in without 
distin guishin g between CTerman combines bas e d on gove rnment 
compulsion and thore established by the free volition of 
private entrepreneurs. In a press release of September 
1. The Status of Cartels in Post-War Europe, by Fritz 
Mac hlup, A Cartel Policy for the United Na tions , 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1945, pag es 33 - 34. 
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17, 1944, issu ed at the Quebec Conference agreement was 
reached on that subject by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill 
as follows: 
"Destruction of German cartels and a core of 
understandin g on dealing with the cartel 
prob le m internationally . " (1) 
For an economic study there can be no question 
that this aspect of the cartel pr oblem as create d by 
Germany is un desirable and injurious to the worl d in ge n -
eral. It seems justified in makin g the basic conclusion 
that politically controlled cartels are undesirable and 
~h ou ld be outlawed in in tern a t1 anal trade for the bene fit 
of all concerned. 
In the present wor ld market in di scussing whether 
or not the Br i tish and Ge r man cartel p olicies woul d have a 
g ood effect one has difficulty in g oin g beyond the point 
of state controllism. The German businessman has never 
ope rated under any other p olicy a n d once the movement got 
under way in Br itain governmental con trol quic k l y took 
over. Even in the case of early Britain, the elements of 
self-interest c an b e seen enterin~ the philosophies of 
Briti sh bus5nessmen, when competition was no lon ger g oing 
to bring them immediate benefits. Self-interest may promp t 
a n entre pren eur to compete or it may cause him to combine. 
British indu s tries probably need a basic structural chan ge 
1. International Car t e ls, Ervin Hexner, Univ . of North 
Carolina Pres s , 1945, page 1 2 . 
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at pre sent to eliminate the problems that were present at 
the turn of t he century an d have ne ver been fa c ed. Germany 
apparently nee ~ s to be re gulated by outside authority since 
she never has shown a ny wil lin gness to accept the policies 
of free trade. 
Even today af ter the apparent effects of cartel 
action on the Ge rman economy, there is evidence tha t German 
businessmen have no intention of resortin o: t o the ways of 
free trade. Dr . H . Salinger, a German e c on0~is t ~ho is 
-- -des c ribed a s having had years of ex pe r ience i n European · 
cartels a n d as havin g been responsible for the formation 
of two profitable corporations in the in tern ,_,_ ti anal en arne l 
in du stry , is openly advocatin F the return of Germany to a 
cartel policy. 
" Freed water s lead to floo d s n writes Dr. Saling er 
referring to the consequences of re movin g trade c~ntrols 
from European countries as recommended by the or gahization 
for European e c onomic c o-opera tion. The revival of 
industri a l g roup in g s joining Europeans basic industries 
across frontiers is becomin g more in d is pensable from day to 
day as obstacles to trade are pulled aside by hi?h 
author ity he declares. 
11 Market and p ro du c tion re gulations are needed as 
the basis for an organ i call y growin g national 
and international Eur opean economic organiza-
tion, tt 
Dr. Salin ger p ostu l a tes. 
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The Ge r -: 8.n cart e l advocate believes any form of 
anti-trust le g islation to be outmoded. The European 
economist further warn s tha t r: estern Europe, if it does 
n o t organ ize cartels quickly an d make suitable deals with 
Co rrmunist countries will face a flood of cheap g oods from 
Western Eu rope. (1) 
Here a gain we see the ol d economic authoritarian 
principl e of Germany cite d , whether this German e conomist, 
wh ose theories are expounded a bove, are founde d upon 
p olitical or e conomic p olicy i s not clear. The return to 
cartel organization could only hav e the e ffe ct of le ssenin g 
c onsumption for ind i vid ua l~ in any c ountry invol ve d , by 
either the mani~ulation of price or restr i ction of produc-
tion. The c3iff icul t y vii th the f lo·w of g oo cl s from ~: estern 
Europe into Ge rm8.ny is not economic in natur~ but apparent-
l y political. Probably wha t Dr. Salinger is s aying is 
t ha t shoul d Ge rman y be forced to do business wi th Russia, 
she wi ll have to have a combination equal ly as strong as 
the Russian combine (wh ich will be cartel in nature) or she 
will be made a victim of politically a g gres s ive policy 
whi ch a re we l l knm'.' n to Ge rmany. 
In connec tion with this revival of t he carte l 
s p irit in Germany it must b e brought to lig ht the d ifficulty 
1. European Ca rtels Openl y ~dvocated, by Michael L. 
Hoffman , New Yo rk Times, December 25, 1949. 
of a ctually atte mp tin r to bre ak up the great German combine s 
a fter the Rei c h's military potential had been beaten. In 
1 945 there is evidence that pressure wa s bein g brou ght by 
b usinessmen to have I . G. Farben magnates released from 
internshi p . This pressure was a t leas t partly successful 
and there seems to be a great deal of ques ti on a s to where 
it orig inate d . (1 ) 
A d is pa tch to the New York Time s by Delbert 
Cla r k dated Be rlin, October 20, 1 947, sounds the same 
om i nous note . Re p ortin g the resignation of Germany's 
H . Martin, chief of the decarte li zation branch, Mr. Clark 
commented: 
" Mr. Mar tin fe lt there was a consistent campaign 
inside and ou tsi de the mi l itary government to 
b loc k de c a rteliza t ion and once it haC b e en 
accomplished on paper to prevent its physical 
ac c ompLishment. n 
One of the b locks t o the decartelization movement 
ir.. Ge r many is obviously p res en t day Britain which now is 
well on he r way to a socialis ti c economy based on priva te 
dem ocracy. On October 22, 1946 Britain's l abor secretary, 
Ernest Bevin, made the s t atemen t t hat Ge rman industries 
woul e be tak e n out of the hands of domestic cartelists and 
place d in t he hands of pub l ic owne r ship . There is evidence 
that this socialization movemen t in Germany may only b e one 
ste p below cartelization an d the d oor betwe en the tw o very 
thin . 
1. Germa ny V'i ha t Now? Joa chim Joe s tim~ Zi ff-Dav is 
Publishin g Co., Ch icag o, 1 947, page 184 
lO:b. 
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